Page 238 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

238 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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by aerial reconnaissance, or to detect suspicious signs of imminent attack, as it was
possible to stop its advance with intimidating aerial fire. In the following stage the
enemy hides in the forest and ambushes the military columns, by flogging actions
against the barracks, being much more difficult to detect them; the enemy forces in
presence have now a military character, with political and technical preparation, and
begin using more sophisticated armament - instead of machetes and canhangulos,
they start having automatic weapons, mines and shells, decreasing the attacks on the
population and attacking our forces, according to the technique of hit and run, filter-
ing through the jungle, a difficult place to penetrate by conventional military forces.
However, they have other type of difficulties: the adherence of the population, es-
tranged from ideological or political motivation, which in its majority wants peace
above all, and the need of getting supplies across the border by creating corridors of
infiltration with a minimum of fixed points or routes considered indispensable but
detectable by air.
As mentioned, the air operations were very much oriented for visual reconnais-
sance, for armed reconnaissance, to attack small and very well located guerrilla tar-
gets, for close air support to ground forces, in addition to logistical support actions
for the benefit of the military forces. The missions of assault with helicopters and
special forces, with fire support given by the T - 6, the PV2, the F - 84, and the heli-
copter gunship (side fire power with 20 m/m cannon shot) were very relevant in the
context of operational situation. Also the air action of tracking enemy trails, execut-
ed with helicopters and paratroopers, which consisted of discovering and tracking
the infiltrators from the North, concluded by detection, arrest or attack on guerrilla
groups in supplying operations was a very significant example of use of air power.
In Angola there was only one main operating air base, BA No 9, throughout all
the period of war until 1975 (in Portuguese classification military airfields could be
main operating airbase – BA, aerodrome bases – AB, tactical airfields – AM, and
alternate or temporary airfields – AR, depending on the infrastructure, the volume of
resources and the organiza tion). There were two aerodrome bases, one in Negage,
AB 3, built in 1961 as we have already seen and the other in Henri que de Carvalho,
AB 4, implemented afterwards. It was yet legally established a third one aerodrome
base, the AB10 in Serpa Pinto, but was never activated. In addition to these major
infrastructures there were still tactical airfields (AM) and alternate airfields. Depend-
ent on BA 9 there was the AM95 in Cabinda; AM 31 in Maquela do Zombo, AM
32 in Toto, AM 33 in Malange depended on the AB 3; dependent on AB 4 were AM
41 in Portugalia, AM 42 in Camaxilo, AM 43 in Cazombo and AM 44 in Luso. The
alternate airfields were the N’Riquinha, Cuito Canavale and Gago Coutinho. From
the tumultuous times of the year 1961, military operations in Angola entered a phase
of routine in the Northern Intervention Zone, in that it was characterized by typical
guerrilla warfare, with control of territory by the Portuguese forces.
However other movements appeared, the MPLA and UNITA, and the ini tial
movement of UPA developed into FNLA. For political reasons, these forces moved