Page 243 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment
P. 243

doCtrine, CapaCities, teCHnology and operational environment on tHe employment of tHe air power; tHe Case of guerrilla warfare 243



            case. For example, in 1965 8 DO, 6 T6, 1 AL III, 2 G91 and a C47 were hit; in 1966
                              nd
            2 DO, 9 T6, in the 2  semester; in 1967 5 DO, 5 T6, 3 AL III, and 2 G91; in all these
            cases the aircrafts were repaired at the Base. The most serious case occurred in 1968
            when a G91 was gunned down and the pilot ejected successfully, leaving unharmed.
            The anti-aircraft guns returned again to silence at a given period, at the end of which
            a new offensive took place, which was followed by a new stop – from the guerrilla
            point of view it mattered to embarrass air activity, since it was the element of imbal-
            ance in the development of the war, but it is assumed that the use of anti-aircraft guns
            brought too many risks. And it is at the end of these cycles of activation / deactiva-
            tion that the missile surface - air Strella arises in 1973, with very significant results
            within a very short time: a G91 and its pilot killed with explosion on the air, 2 G91
            put down, in which pilots were ejected and were recovered, 1 DO 27 shot down with
            two pilots, one T6 shot down with a pilot. This version of the missile had vulner-
            ability though: it had technical limitations in its launching, which conditioned its
            efficiency (at a very low altitude and distance was not very effective, and its range
            was around 10,000 feet), and produced a lot of smoke which allowed detection of the
            launching site and subsequent attack. Despite this, its introduction in the theatre of
            operations changed substantially the way of operating air assets and created a strong
            sense of insecurity.


            A brief overview of the war in Mozambique
               The war in Mozambique had also different characteristics from those of Angola
            and Guinea.
               On August 24, 1964 a missionary in the Maconde plateau is murdered, stabbed
            to death. This action was attributed to ideological motivation and its authorship to
            rebellious elements of the UNA (National African Union). A month later an attack to
            an administrative post and to a headquarters of Mueda takes place, this time led by
            FRELIMO. These facts created insecurity in the Northern Province, especially in the
            district of Cabo Delgado, which required a specific military organization to counter
            this threat.
               The air bases established from that time, which was progressively garnis hed with
            air assets was as follows:
               - The BA No. 10 in Beira;
               - The AB5 in Nacala;
               - The AB6 in Nova Freixo;
               - The AB7 in Tete;
               - The AB8 in Lourenço Marques;
               - The AM 51 in Mueda;
               - The AM 52 in Nampula;
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