Page 97 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

between “douhetIsm” And “close AIr support”. the germAn AIr wAr doctrIne In world wAr II 97

all, had no experience in commanding large flying units. Here, organizational prob-
31
lems occurred, which could not be solved until the beginning of the war“. The air
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war doctrines both in France and in the Soviet Union were, however, also charac-
terized by similar considerations that were mainly directed towards supporting own
and friendly army troops.
In 1936, headquarters and agencies of the German Air Force received the result
of their own considerations on a German air war doctrine in the form of German Air
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Force Regulation L.Dv. 16. It was entitled “Luftkriegführung“, and was divided
into the following seven sections: Air war, command and control, reconnaissance,
operations, deployment, ground organization and replacement/supply. The latter two
sections, however, remained void for the time being. They were to be filled later on,
which was, however, never done due to the beginning of the war. Instead, in the year
of war 1940, an unchanged version of German Air Force Regulation L.Dv. 16 was
reprinted and published.
First, the reader learned that the air warfare regulation addressed basic air war
principles, which would be those acts of war “resulting from the independent ap-
pearance of the German Air Force as the third branch of the Wehrmacht”. It was,
however, expressly mentioned that the regulation would only be a suggestion, since
the principles established in the regulation required verification by the field units
after advanced training and correction of technical deficiencies. It was also stated in
the introduction that the German Air Force would be responsible for both offensive
and defensive air war operations. After a listing of what belonged to the German Air
Force in terms of organization and weapons, the following sentence was to be found:
“The aviation forces will take the war to enemy territory right from the very start
of war. Their attacks will target the roots of both the enemy’s combat power and its
people’s will of resistance”.
This was followed by a description of the tasks of the German Air Force in an
air war. The most important task of the Wehrmacht in a war was to break the en-
emy’s will, the strongest expression of which were the armed forces of the enemy.
Conducting the war in the air within the framework of the overall war, the German
Air Force therefore had to serve the most noble war aim: To bring down the enemy
forces. Fighting against the enemy air power, it would weaken the enemy forces
and, at the same time, protect both its own armed forces and its own people in its

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Deist, Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht (see Note 17), p. 480.
32
Cf. Thierry Vivier, Le Douhétisme français entre Tradition et Innovation, 1933-1939, in: Revue
historique des Armées, 206 (1997), p. 89-99.
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Cf. James Sterrett, Soviet Air Force Theory, 1918-1945. London 2007.
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Luftwaffendienstvorschrift (L.DV. 16) “Luftkriegführung“ in der Version vom März 1940, in: Karl-
Heinz Völker, Dokumente und Dokumentarfotos zur Geschichte der deutschen Luftwaffe. Aus den
Geheimakten des Reichswehrministeriums 1919-1933 und des Reichsluftfahrtministeriums 1933-
1939 (Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.) , Vol.
9). Stuttgart 1968, p. 466-486.