Page 99 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

between “douhetIsm” And “close AIr support”. the germAn AIr wAr doctrIne In world wAr II 99

to when the attack would go forward will be based on a preceding enemy terrorist
attack. It must definitely be clear that the attack is launched for retaliatory reasons.
Retaliation attacks require a detailed knowledge and an intuitive understanding of
the way of thinking and moral condition of the enemy population. Choosing the
wrong time and miscalculating the desired effect on the opponent might strengthen
his will of resistance instead of shaking it. 35
When looking at the air war doctrine of the German Air Force within the context
of its planned and actually implemented armaments projects, it shows that center and
36
pivotal point of the German air war doctrine was the support of the Army. To con-
duct a strategic air war according to Douhet, Trenchard or Mitchell, the development
of a strategic four-engine bomber capable of covering long distances would have
been indispensable. Although Wever, in his function as the Chief of the Air Force
General Staff, had tried to get this project under way before he died in a plane crash
in June 1936, the project was cancelled even before the war.
In a presentation on the subject of “Basic Principles for Operational Command
and Control of the Air War”, delivered in October 1936, Major Paul Deichmann,
Chief of the Command and Control Division at the Luftkommandoamt, supported
attacks against the enemy’s sources of power on the one hand and the generic popu-
lation’s “will of resistance” on the other in addition to support provided to Army and
Navy operations. „The presentation illustrated, however, that in this field, too, the
higher commanders held rather vague views and the systematic processing of related
questions had just begun“. 37
In 1936, Hitler promised General Franco to support airlift operations from
Spanish-Morocco to the Spanish mainland. After 15,000 Moroccan soldiers and le-
gionaries of the Spanish Foreign Legion and a considerable amount of material had
been moved with “Junkers Ju 52” aircraft, Franco was able to employ them in the
Spanish Civil War. Germany extended its support of Franco by dispatching a sup-
port unit by the name of “Legion Condor”, including various aircraft and pilots. The
Spanish Civil War provided the German volunteers of the “Legion Condor”, who
had temporarily been released from the Wehrmacht for this, with the opportunity
to fly sorties under wartime conditions, thus being able to test the training status of
pilots, newly developed types of aircraft and theoretical procedures in the field of
38
air support. Besides existing aircraft types, for example, the new Messerschmidt
Me Bf 109 fighter aircraft, the fast two-engine Heinkel He 111 bombers and the
Dornier Do 17 aircraft could be employed in Spain. Wolfram v. Richthofen, the

35
Ibid., p. 482.
36
Cf. James S. Corum, »The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941«, in: Journal of Strategic
Studies 59 (1995), p. 68-90.
37
Deist, Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht (see Note 17), p. 494.
38
Cf. James S. Corum, »The Luftwaffe and the Coalition Air War in Spain, 1936-1939«, in: Journal
for Strategic Studies, 18 (1995), p. 68-90.