Page 98 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

98 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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Lebensraum. Engaging in the operations and combat actions on the ground and at
sea, the German Air Force would provide direct support to Army and Navy. Engaging
the sources of power of enemy forces and stopping the flow of enemy forces towards
the front, the German Air Force would try to bring the enemy forces to a halt. The
German Air Force would thus combat the enemy people and country at its most ten-
der spots. Moreover, apologetically, so to speak, the regulation read: “These attacks
might have accidental side effects which cannot be avoided”. (Today, to be more
diplomatic, this is defined as “collateral damage”!).
Already at the start of the war, German Air Force Regulation L.Dv. 16 provided
for the offensive employment of the German Air Force against enemy air forces, if
only to minimize the threat to ones own territory. A certain degree of uncertainty as
to the efficiency of support to direct army and navy operations – referred to as “close
air support” today - was reflected in the following sentences: “In close cooperation
with the Army and the Navy, frequently the German Air Force, i.e. mainly its com-
bat forces [this refers to bombers R.P.], will not find the targets, the engagement of
which would fully utilize its offensive power and the destruction of which could
entail efficient support for Army or Navy [...] Generally, air attacks on unimpaired
or uncommitted ground forces that are employed at the front or in position do not
promise any effects that are in keeping with the respective effort, but they will by no
means be excluded in special cases”.
It was considered more expedient to launch attacks on long-range targets “the
destruction or elimination of which will have decisive influence on the operations or
combat actions of Army or Navy […] massive attacks, mostly in low-altitude flights,
against advancing reserves or moving forces in rear areas and retreating enemy forc-
es, [can be R.P.] of decisive importance”. Following these explanatory notes con-
cerning the situation we today refer to as interdiction, it was stated that a war could
only be decided if all three branches of the Wehrmacht cooperated. With this, the au-
thors of the memorandum, who originally came from the Army, wanted to counter an
unnecessary build up of the Air Force in order to reduce the prejudices existing in the
two other Wehrmacht branches against the new Service, the personnel and materiel
establishment of which had, of course, been carried out at their expense.
Furthermore, the regulation focused on the engagement of the enemy’s sources
of power, i.e. all facilities serving the strengthening and augmentation of his fighting
forces. This included attacks on enemy armaments production sites, food supplies,
imports, electricity, gas and water supplies, railways and transport lines, military
operations centers and the enemy’s seat of government, if this was the center of the
enemy’s intellectual and moral resistance.
A separate chapter of the regulation was dedicated to retaliation attacks. In its
introduction, it read: “Attacks on cities for the purpose of terrorizing the popula-
tion must on principle be declined. Nevertheless, if the enemy launches terrorist
attacks on defenseless and unprotected open cities, retaliation attacks might be the
only means to divert the enemy from this brutal type of air warfare. The decision as