Page 182 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

168 ODYSSEUS N. KAPETOS

Certainly, some of the Greek allies found Athenian democracy attractive an d
considered Athenian power necessary to peace and stability. Some recognized tht:
fairness of Athen's judicial system and the economie advantages of a single mone-
tary standard, and some found tribute a small price for Athenian protection. But
for others, the presence of Athenian garrisons was sign of their -loss of freedom
and autonomy.
In sum, Athen's allies were not only a source of strength but also an Achilles'
heel. Thus the city had not only to fighe the enemy but to keep many of its own
allies in line by force. As long as Athens could do both, it would survive; but any
misstep that might seriously, even if temporarily, damage che fleet or the army would
in vite che alli es to break away, leaving Athens alone.
Indeed, this was to be the conseguence of the Sicilian expedition during the
Peloponnesian War, fought from 431 B.C. unti! 404 B.C. against a Spartan-led
alli ance.

The Campaign in Sicily

The policy of Pericles as the Peloponnesian war began was one of patience
and consolidation. He stressed Athens advantage in seapower and chose not to en-
gage che enemy in land battles.
Pericles knew too, that an Athenian defeat would encourage allies to defect.
Neither would Pericles support operations very far from home.
His scrategy, was, to exhaust the enemy, attacking che Peloponnesian allies
by sea.
The strategy worked, but Pericles died in 429 B.C. For Athens the loss was
tragic. lt was left to the politici an and generai Nicias to counsel prudence.
Yet when che opportunity arose co launch an attack on Syracuse, the ambi-
tious leader Alcibiades persuaded the Athenians to support it, over che protesta-
don of Nicias. The expedition, which sailed in 415 B.C. required an enormous
commitment of money, ships, and men, bue it promised, if all went well, to secure
a major source of grain supplies.
Ali did not well. Arguments among the leaders of expedition, which included
both Nicias and Alcibiades, gave the Syracusans ampie warning.
Alcibiades himself defected to the Spartans.
The Syracusans di d not surrender, and when generai Nicias, o n che poi ne of
withdrawal in September 413 B.C., delayed his departure, Syracusans attacked and
destroyed the Athenian force.
Thucydides comments that «their losses were rotai; army, navy, everything was
destroyed». The delicate equilibrium of the Athenian empire was dainaged. Allies
rebelled and defected and, as Pericles had said, Athens was helpless to prevent them.

The weakness of ground forces and Persian lntervention
If it had maintained a better army, Athens may well have been able to prose-
cute a more agressive war against Sparta from 431 to 421, avere the disaster in Sicily