Page 185 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

ATHENS IN THE 5th CENTURY B.C. THE REPUBLIC OF VENICE 171

Poor Decisions and Inferior Numhers

The Ottomans might have been held at bay had the Venetian Commander,
been less timid.
· He was one of a succession of poor generals hired by the Venetians.
However, o n the ground the Venetians were simply no match for the Otto-
mans who could muster tens of thousands of well trained soldiers for coordinated
attacks on the Aegean coasts by sea and land.
While Venice could overmatch anyone at sea, it could not face the Ottomans
by land.
Problems of logistics, corruption, and personal feuding went unsolved; expe-
rienced soldiers were in short supply after thirty years of fighting. In addition, the
Venetian army was distracted by a dispute with Austria that led to an assault on
Trieste.
The Venetian Senate would not send troops farther east, with the result that
throughout the war its Aegean forces were inferior'"in number to the Ottomans.
After Negroponte fell, Venice carried on the fruitless war for another nine
years before the Great Council reluctantly agreed to settle for peace. Venice, though
relatively prosperous at the outset, had by 1479 unwisely spent its treasure and
strength an d ha d thus lost its p la ce in the front ranks of power.

Conclusion

The two case studi es above suggest that W ar contributes a great deal to the
decline of a state. ·
The Athenian denouement was a consequence of a prol~nged struggle; Athe-
nians believed they could outlast their enemies, but because of their errors and
the resulting disasters, it was they who wearied first and were defeated.
The Venetians too squandered their strenght firsi: on mainland wars that yiel-
ded little gain and then on a futile belated attempt to recover control of the East.
In each of the cases, politicalleaders made choices with identifiable and impor-
tant consequences. Neither the outbreak of the wars nor the manner in which
they were waged seems to bave been inevitable. None of these city-states was
absolutely obliged to go to War.
History does not repeat itself. There are no patterns in History.
Only the leaders repeat the same errors.
In the case of Athens and Venice, specific errors in politicomilitary strategy
direct contributed to their loss of stature.