Page 189 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

VENICE ANO HER ENEMIES, 1453·1573: A CASE STUDY IN STRATEGie FLEXIBIUTY 175

expense of defensive preparations against the limits of di plomatic an d economie
accommodation. That Venice was able to walk that tightrope successfully despite
having to resort to war with the Turk in 1537-1540 and 1570-1573 stands as a
remarkable feat, even withput considering the trials Venice faced on Terraferma
during the same period. When one reflects that Venice, alone among the proud
republics of ltaly, was able to retain her independence, outside the Habsburg and
Valois orbits, during the Wars ofltaly, 1494-1559, that feat seems more remarka-
ble stili. Finally, consider that the strategie storm burst on Venice during a period
of dramatic changes in the technologies and practice or war, occasioned by the per-
fection and widespread adoption of gunpowder weaponry. In short, Venice was
never to face so dramatic a change of fortune and circumstances in so short a time.
Indeed, few states have ever faced so formidable a set or challenges with such
success. There are surely significant lessons to be gained from an analysis of the
manner in which Venice survived and, within the bounds of geo-politica! and eco-
nomie possibilities, prospered.
Definitive answers cannot be given, in no small measure because of the secre-
tive nature of the Venetian ruling elite ... which was arguably a factor in itself. Ne-
vertheless, the evidence supports a number of interlocking causai hypotheses. First,
Venice displayed a politica! stability, based on the support or at least the acquie-
science of the mass of the populace which her governments controlled, which gave
her rulers more than the usual amount of room for diplomatic and military maneu-
ver. Granted, a Frederick II or a Lorenzo de Medici might display more brilliance
and dexterity over the short run, but the Senate and Council of Ten maintained
a solid consistency of performance, year in and year out, which no comparable
contemporary European institution could match, save perhaps the Ottoman Di-
van, and it only through the mid-reign of Siileyman l.
Second, the Venetian ruling elite displayed a remarkably high, and remarka-
bly uniform, level of operational competence in maritime commerce and warfare,
starting with the clear appreciation that the cwo could not be cleanly separated.
As any scholar who has examined early modern Venetian naval documents will readily
testify, Venetian officials from top to bottom understood the operational basics and
tactical nuances of war at sea. The Senate and Council of Ten knew what their
subordinate commanders at sea were up against as well as any equivalent ruling
body every has, and if their grasp of the finer points of warfare on land was not
as secure, they had the administrative flexibility to improvise and delegate and the
politica! shrewdness to retain effective contro! O>.
Third, the Venetian Republic during the period in question demonstrated an
aptitude for operational adaptation and technological innovation truly uncommon
in the broad sweep ofhistory. Moreover, Venice was remarkably successful in inte-
grating these innovations into the republic's strategy at the highest levels. Beset with
a chronic manpower shortage, Venice found ways to create and apply capitai in-
vestment to create what we would today cali force multipliers, time and again