Page 190 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

176 JOHN P. GUILMARTIJI.:

effectively nullyfying seemingly impossible odds against ber. The swiftness with which
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Venice took the lead in mounting heavy ordnance on the bows of galleis < >; the
role ofFra Giacondo' s sunkGm forcifications in the successful defense of Padua against
the combined forces of France, the Pope and the Habsburgs in 1509; and tbe role
of the Venetian galeasses at Lepanto in 15 71 are only spectacular cases in poi n t.
Venetian cannon were, on the whole, ligbter, handier, and better handled, than
those of her e nemi es. Venetian galleys were faster under oars than those of the we-
stern ltalians, Spanish and Turks. They were also easier to row, an important con-
sideration in light of the fact that Venetian oarsmen were free men and expected
to fight upon contact <3>.
Fourth, the Venetian leadership- and bere we come full circle- shoved an
uncommon willingness to exploit whatever means were available and most suitable
to the task at band to secure the republic's policy goals. Except in the most despe-
rate of times the bottom line was economics, but commerciai profits were a means
to an end, a more or less clearly delineated band along a continuous spectrum of
means wbicb included bribery, diplomacy and armed force applied in various de-
grees of intensity. Significandy, Venice seems to bave regularized a means of con-
verting future commerciai profits into funds to meet the crisis of the moment in
the form of the Monte Nuovo of 1482 <4>.
Analysis of selected strategie problems confronting Venice during the period
in question bighlights these factors. I will begin with a cursory analysis of under-
lying geograpbic, macro-economic and cultura! factors, proceed through an asses-
sment of the development and exploitation of key tecbnologies, and finish with a
brief recounting of salient strategie challenges faced by Venice and how she dealt
with them. My analysis will address military capabilities, strategies and operations
within the broader context of alternative strategie approaches, including diploma-
cy and economie means.
lt is a truism to assert that Venice's geographic location was vital to ber re-
markable strategie resiliance, but the mechanism bears closer inspection. First, of
course, Venice could hardly bave survived, let alone prospered, had sbe not been
separated from the mainland by water. Second, her posi ti o n a t tbe head of the Adria-
tic, between the entrepots of the eastern Mediterranean and tbe Alpine passes pro-
viding access to the markets of Germany, yieldel enormous economie benefits, but
only so long as oared propulsion offered importane economie and military advan-
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tages < >. Third, the chain of island bases along the Dalmatian coast, in the Aegean,
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an d along the coast of Asia Minor magnified that advantage < >. But this was true,
again, only so long as human propulsion was an importane component of mariti-
me trade and conflict. On the negative side of the balance, the steady depletion
of nearby reserves of shipbuilding timber was already becoming a problem, and
was to be a major factor in Venice's subseguent decline.
A prime structural factor bebind Venice's strategie resilience was ber remar-
kable politica! structure and social cohesion, a cohesion whicb endured long after