Page 188 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996

174 JOHN F. GUILMARTIN

of significant revenue. The Portuguese had undermined che basis of ber commer-
ciai power by bypassing che traditional spice routes and che Ottomans had gained
control of their eastern termini, depriving Venice of much of her diplomatic leve-
rage. In partial compensation, Venice had sustained, and even expanded, her posi-
tion on the ltalian mainland.
In strategie terms, che Venice which emerged from che War of Cyprus was
a very different state from chat of a cenrury and a quarter earlier, as much an Ira-
Han land power as one capable of maritime power projection. While maritime tra-
de was stili che economie glue which held che Republic togecher, che global
importance, if not che absolute value, of that trade had declined sharply. Taxes
raised from the Terraferma were vital to che fiscal solvency of the state, and main-
tenance of che territories in question was the raiJon d'etre of much of the Venetian
nobility. No longer a major power by any reasonable measure, Venice had endured
as an independent nation-state, preserving che values which had made her great.
Though the developments in question are beyond che bounds of the present analy-
sis, Venice continued to survive economically and militarily for anocher two cenru-
ries, accepting changing geo-politica! realities and enduing as best she could until
che rising tide of new technologies of trans-oceanic trade made her location - hi-
therto the key to ber prosperity and strategie importance, if not her survival - irre-
levant.
My purpose bere is to discern how Venice achieved che strategie successes ou-
tlined above. The.potentiallessons to be gained are not trivial, for Venice played.
a weak band very well indeed, showing a surprising constancy of purpose and self-
confidence in her politica! institutions and displaying a strategie adaptability whicb
was - and is - truly remarcable. Indeed, it may be reasonably argued chat che rise
and fall of che Venetian Republic was paced and driven as mucb by geograpbic,
tecbnological and economie change, factors essentially beyond the control of the
body politic, as by politica! error or mi$chance or inability to adapt to emergent
technologies.
The focus of the analysis which follows, o n the peri od 145 3-15 72, represents
a period of particularly wrenching strategie transition. The loss of most Venetian
territory in Greece to the Ottomans in 1463-1479, notably Negroponte, was apre-
lude of worse chings to come. While che Venetian Republic arguably faced more
difficult trials during the Chioggian War of 1378-1381, che shock of che loss of
virtually the entirety of her holdings on Terraferma following disastrous defeat at
Agnadello in 1509 runs a dose second, tbe more so since it followed tbe loss of
most of her few remaining holdings in Greece to the Ottomans in 1499-1503. To
make matters worse, chese defeats took piace in a rime of difficult economie transi-
tion. Porruguese depredations in che Inclian Ocean from tbe turn of che sixteench
century seriously disrupted che spice trade through Cairo, Alexandria, ~nd Aleppo
from che rurn of sixteentb century, an d rh e fall of che Mamluk sultana te to the Or-
romans deprived che Venetians of most of whatever diplomàtiè leverage chey had
in Egypt. From that point, Venice had to walk a strategie tightrope, bal~ncing the