Page 184 - Il Mediterraneo quale elemento del Potere Marittimo - Atti 16-18 settembre 1996
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170                                                        ODYSSEUS N.  KAPE.J."OS


            The Mainland Wars
                Until Francesco Foscare was  elected Doge in  1423, Venetian foreign  policy
           had aimed a t keeping peace with even the most hostile of the mainland states of ltaly.
                Foscare changed this approach and with it the direction of Venetian history.
                A year after Foscare was invested, Venice went to war against Milan. lt was
            perhaps the most ambitious war on which Venice had ever embarked, yet the re-
            sults were most disappointing. After seven years of fighting the Venetians had won
            no victories of lasting importance, had spent millions of ducats to support their
            field  army,  and  stili  had failed  to  curb the  Milanese appetite.
                The Republic did indeed gain territory on the «terra firma» surrounding its
            islands in the Lagoon of Venice, but the cost of obtaining and protecting these new
            lands proved à  crippling burden. Fighting continued sporadically for  twenty-five
            years, with no further conquests, while the treasury continued to dwindle. VeniCe
            could neither come to acceptable terms with Milan nor win a decisive victory. Pea-
            ce was not made until1455. By that time, however, the strategie equation had been
            changed, by the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans two years before. The Ve-
            netians, had been too absorded by the fighting in ltaly to  consider plans for  the
            defence of their islands in the Aegean sea, which was now · threatened. Venice, in
            fact,  could  now  do  little to  recoup  its  prior strategie contro! in the East.

            The problem of the Allies

                Even  if the  city had wanted to  reinforce its  post in the  Aegean  Sea,  it was
            in no position to do so. After thirty years of fighting in ltaly, money and manpower
            were both in short supply. Foscare's successor, Pasquale Malipiero, attempted to
            keep peace with the Ottomans, even as he sought allies to help retake Constantino-
            ple, but no firm support was forthcoming from any W ester n power. Mali piero de-
            cided  to  bide his  time;  business  continued as  usual until his  death in  1462.
                The new Doge, Christoforo Moro, reversed course and, with Great Council,
            approved an alliance with Pope ~ius Il, the Duke of Burgundy, and the King of
            Hungary. These allies  were worth little;  Burgundy did not deliver the money or
            the proops  promised,  the Pope's  coffers  were  nearly empty,  and the Hungarian
            army,  hundreds of miles  to  the  north.
                Venice was  alone. Just as  the Venetians had earlier  reversed their policy of
            cautious detachment from mainland wars, entangling themselves in an endless war
            with Milan, they now discarded allied action against the Ottomans and continued
            by themselves.  To take on the Ottomans was  difficult enough;  to do  so  without
            allies was nearly hopeless; and to enter this contest after decades of mainland war
            was  fatefoul  indeed.
                Severa! years went by without either a significant victory or a significant de-
            feat for the Ottomans or the Venetians. Finally, the large island ofNegroponte (Eu-
            boea)  the Venetian  strongbold  near Athens  was  lost in  1470.
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