Page 113 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I
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          ActA
          follow to block the likely hostile actions by the Greek fleet. When the Persians where
          reaching, the Greeks decided to confront them at the Thermopylae Straits on land and at
          the nearby cape of Artemision at sea, a very appropriate point for assembling the Hellenic
          fleet. At the level of strategic planning, a joint land and naval operation was decided; the
          army and the fleet were thus in a position to support one another effectively, in a defen-
          sive mission. Xerxes delayed his advance mainly because he also had planned to launch a
          coordinated attack from land   and sea. The likely aim of the Greeks at Thermopylae was
          to stop the advance of the Persian army for some time, until the outcome of the war was
          decided by the fleet at the sea. That was the mission that Leonidas served by his sacrifice.
          The simultaneous resistance at Thermopylae and the conduct of a parallel naval battle il-
          lustrate the conception of a joint strategic manoeuvre. Even more, at the operational level,
          there was an observer at Artemision, ready to sail and inform the army at Thermopylae of
          any adversities the navy could run into. However, the Athenian liaison to Leonidas camp
          at Thermopylae was the one who sailed to the cape and announced Leonidas death.
             Landing Operation in Salamis: In preparing for the significant naval battle in Salamis,
          the Persian ships spread along a continuous line while military divisions lined up in the
          land close to the shore, so as to provide support to the shipwrecked. The Athenian hoplites
          effectively collaborated with the navy, forming amphibious assault echelons; following
          the retreat of the Persians, they landed in the occupied territory and crushed the isolated
          guard. That operation involving the transport of infantry and its forced landing possessed
          the features of a real amphibious operation in contrast to similar operations in the past that
          either involved disembarking in a controlled area, or mere piracy.
             The Battle of Mycale (479 BC): Greeks did not hesitate to take over a new initia-
          tive, when the Ionians requested their aid to cast off the Persian occupation. The Persians
          camped in the bay of Mycale, across the island of Samos and when the Greek fleet headed
          to the island, the Persian admirals decided to resort to the army’s protection. They sailed
          towards Mycale, drew their ships ashore, joined their forces with the land army and forti-
          fied their camp by building a wooden wall. When the Greeks reached close to the Persian
          camp, they saw no one sailing against them but only ships drawn ashore; they marched
          against them and managed to achieve a victory setting on fire the Persian ships on earth.


          Delian League - I Athenian Coalition (478 BC)

             The end of the Persian wars brought up a change of balance in the Greek territory.
          Even though Sparta was the undisputed leading military power, it was Athens that, having
          developed a powerful navy was found ready to take up the leadership role . During the
                                                                            3
          period of the first Athenian Coalition, the critical importance of controlling the Aegean led
          to the development of a new strategy for the independent action of the navy to obtain the
          control of the sea. The ship was used as a weapon and not merely as a transporting means,
          assuming a joint action that served to project its power on the land, without though the
          requirement for the parallel movement of the army along with the navy. The two hundred
          Athenian triremes constituted an outstanding war fighting means, as they were wider than

          3  “...the admirals decided to find resort by the Army”, Ibid., X, 96.
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