Page 114 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

114 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

the old ones and especially designed “allowing space for moving along the deck”. There
was enough space for hoplites and archers on board, allowing them to move with ease on
their decks. They were reasonably classified as warships and at the same time carriage
ships suitable for carrying out landings with ease and speed even on shores that were oc-
cupied by the enemy.
4
The Expedition to the River Eurymedon (469 BC) : The assembly of the Persian army
and fleet at Pamphylia, in 468 B.C., having the apparent aim to advance to the Asia Minor
coast and the Aegean, served to activate and strengthen the Athenian alliance. The under-
taking of significant operations against the Persians averted the danger of defections. It
was imperative for that operation to succeed, as its outcome would determine the future
of the alliance. Kimon was appointed the leader of the expedition to Asia Minor and he
5
proved to be a competent general . To him has been attributed the changes that were made
to the Athenian triremes of that period so as to become wider providing more space not
only for the rowers but for the hoplites as well.
That change was deemed necessary as the struggle against the Persians was meant to
assume an offensive form. Apart from their crews, the ships should also carry on board
military forces capable of landing on ground and undertaking immediate action against
the enemy. Kimon assembled three hundred ships at the city of Knidos in Karia. Of those,
200 were from Athens. Apart from the rowers, there were 5,000 hoplites on board those
ships. Aboard the 100 allied triremes there were some archers as well. Kimon took advan-
tage of the Persians indecisiveness to come into a naval battle against him before receiving
reinforcements. They thought that the Greeks would not dare to launch an offensive in
that position, considering that their fleet was well protected by the strong infantry that was
deployed in the river’s mouth. Kimon surprised them and forced them into a naval battle.
Instead of the Persian ships sailing to the river’s mouth, they turned to the opposite side.
That fact proved fatal for the Persian fleet.
Were they had managed to get to the open sea, they would have had a good chance of
prevailing. Instead, they were soon ambushed. The fast Athenian triremes exploited su-
perbly that confusion. They penetrated into the mouth of river Eurymedon and started to
cause severe blows to the enemy ships by their plungers. The Persians shot a great number
of arrows from their ship decks. However, the land like method of conducting the naval
battle had no chance of success against the more advanced Athenian tactics of using the
plungers. On the same day, following the naval battle and despite the Persian fleet’s an-
nihilation, a strong Persian force comprised mainly of archers and infantry continued to
be in the river flanks. They were deployed in a smooth and plain territory that was fit for
the operation of the hoplites phalanx. The Greek triremes approached to the shore – their
manoeuvre was possible because the river was navigable in its mouth - and Kimon or-
dered the landing and the hasty deployment of the infantrymen in a battle line up. The land

4 “In the same day the Athenians and their allies conducted a land and a naval battle by Eurymedon river at
Pamphylia, against Persians, under the command of the Athenian General Kimon.” Thucydides, History of
the Peloponnesian War, I, 10, ed. Zacharopoulos, Athens [s.a.]
5 “...Kimon, like a powerful athlete brought down two contests in one day.”, Plutarch, Kimon, 13, ed.
Zacharopoulos, Athens [s.a.]