Page 118 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

118 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

led by the Spartan Gylippus and a Corinthian naval squadron proved to be shrewder and
more competent. They converted and transformed their ships to gain the advantage in the
form of the naval battle they already knew it would follow and into which they would
force the Athenians to fight under the adverse terms they sought to impose on them. The
Athenians held themselves as the absolute masters of the sea and that no fleet could op-
pose them. Nicias was aware and he warned the Athenians of Gylippus plan to launch an
attack against the walls by his infantry on the land and by his ships at the sea. The Athe-
nian fleet derived its strength from the supremacy of its ships and the vigour of the crews.
The long stay at the sea though had adversely affected the ships and the crews. Withdraw-
ing the ships on the shore was not feasible because the enemy, having a superior force
and cavalry was always in a position to attack them. From the other side, a great effort
was required to convince the Syracusians to risk a confrontation with the best navy of that
time. Even though possessing a smaller fleet, the Athenians were very experienced sailors
and they were outstanding in the execution of daring and especially skilful manoeuvres.
As the Athenian army was advancing against the Syracusians, the fleet was reaching in
the Great Harbour. On his arrival, Gylippus lined up his army and he was challenging the
Athenians to a battle in the open field.
The first defeats were succeeded by a victory. The Syracuse fleet was reinforced with
newly built triremes and it started to be prepared and to challenge the Athenians to a bat-
tle. The Athenian fleet was already facing crew shortages and failures from the deficient
maintenance of the ships. After a series of decisive clashes on the land and at sea, the
Syracusians decided to take action against the Athens stronghold at Plimmyrio, carrying
out a joint and coordinated operation against which the Athenians managed to prevail
after a fierce battle. The Athenian army left the fortifications of Plimmyrio and moved
to the shore to watch the naval battle and to defend – in the case of emergency – against
any landings by the enemy ships, to capture their crews and to aid the Athenian ships that
would withdraw to the shore. The Syracusians took advantage of the Athenians absence
to attack the three forts from the land and to capture them. The Athenian fleet, having lost
the potential for replenishment retreated inside the Great Harbour, close to the walls, los-
ing the freedom of movement and the offensive initiative (May 413). After the constant
interchange of victories and defeats on land and at the sea, the Syracusians sought to block
the entrance to the Great Harbour by ships lined up between Plimmyrio and Ortygia to
confine and block the Athenian fleet. Once the Athenians realized their plan, they boarded
their army on all the ships. T
hey had decided to come to a battle and even to burn their own fleet and to depart
from the land in case they were defeated. Nicias manned one hundred and ten triremes.
He boarded several archers and spear throwers on the ships and he lined up the infan-
try along the shore in a far-reaching front to encourage the ship crews. Even though the
greater weight on a ship was a disadvantage in naval battle by hindering its steering, that
would be an advantage for the unavoidable infantry-like battle that would follow aboard
the ship decks. The clash between the two fleets inside the harbour would not be an actual
naval battle but it would be actually an infantry battle carried out from the ship decks.
Consequently the skilled steering of the ships and the performance of manoeuvres ceased