Page 123 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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spread Alexander’s fame. Alexander’s timely and critical decision to reconstitute his fleet
to obstruct the Persian attempts of isolating him – as he was operating in the interior of
Asia Minor – enabled him to combine and to exploit the particular advantages stemming
from the joint operation of the land and the naval forces at the level of strategic planning,
as well as at the tactical level when that was dictated by the physical characteristics of the
position that he was trying to capture.
Nearchus Periplus (326-323 BC): The cooperation between the army and the navy was
illustrated not only in the battlefield but also in the course of an adventurous historical
journey, the Nearchus periplus. Alexander appointed Nearchus as admiral of the navy and
commanded him to sketch in every detail the coastline while looking for the possibility
of establishing naval bases. In his original, truly far-reaching plan, Alexander meant to
combine his own route with that of his ships.
Alexander’s Descendants; the Rhodes Siege (305-304 BC): Alexander’s death in 323
BC caused his generals to entangle in a long struggle for the terms and conditions of divid-
ing up the empire and the dominance in the vast empire that Alexander had created in the
eve of the Hellenistic period. A dominant event in that struggle was the siege of Rhodes
by Demetrius, son of Antigonos. As the cities that a few decades earlier were competing
for leadership in Greece had declined, Rhodes was among the new cities that emerged
and already constituted great cultural and trade centers. Rhodes’ place in the middle of
the trade route between the Aegean and Alexandria led the city develop special relations
with Ptolemeos of Egypt. That contributed to the city’s strengthening and prosperity and
to the Antigonos intention to place the city under his rule. He estimated that by taking
control of the city, he could achieve Egypt’s isolation. Antigonos son, Demetrius was well
known for his ability to conquer fortified cities by siege; in July 305 BC, he recruited 200
warships and 170 cargo ships, an army and crews that totalled 40.000 men. Another 1.000
commercial and pirate ships followed, aiming to lute the rich harbour. The fleet sailed to
the Ialyssos bay where the army landed and camped in a location a little further to the east.
Fortification infrastructure ensured the camp’s communication with the Ialyssos bay and
the harboured ships.
The choice of the particular bay is attributed to its spaciousness. Demetrius exploited
that space and its morphology with proper modifications so as to offer safe shelter to a
numerous fleet. Also, the highlands above the bay were suitable for setting a camp. From
there he could control the main coastal route between the city and the rest of the island,
survey the south side of the walls and ensure the safe communication with the shore and
the fleet by the appropriate fortification works. Demetrius intent of using the land force
jointly with the fleet and the use of the each one’s advantages in the particular geographi-
cal space is illustrated in the planning and it is later confirmed in the operations. The city
of Rhodes was built in the northern part of the island, forming an irregular triangle that
faced to the North.
The western and eastern sides – where there were three spacious and fortified harbors
- were oriented to the sea, while the city’s south side on the land was opposite Demetrius
camp. The offensive operation started from the east so as to isolate the city from the east
and to stop the Rhodes ship raids. The walls on the seaside were more vulnerable and the