Page 339 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
and leading him into a posture and terrain that diminishes his ability to defend against
the counterattack of the larger, mobile reserve. 6
But Mustafa Kemal Ataturk claimed the opposite. He believed in area defensive doc-
trine. In an area defense, the bulk of defending forces deploy to retain ground, using a
combination of defensive positions and small, mobile reserves. Commanders organize
the defense around a static framework provided by defensive positions, seeking to de-
stroy enemy forces with interlocking fires. Commanders also employ local counterat-
tacks against enemy units penetrating between defensive positions. At the beginning of
the operation, main defensive line is coastal line. In the mean time, a security area or
covering force is also part of an area defense. Land Battles proved him right. The reason
7
why the great losses and casualties suffered was General Liman Von Sanders’ the mobile
defensive doctrine.
Other failure of General Sanders was not to select the key terrain. In his opinion
he estimated that one of the main amphibious objects might have been Bolayir in the
European side and Kumkale in the Asian side. But Mustafa Kemal Ataturk claimed the
opposite. He thought of Kocaçimen Tepe as the most important key terrain of the main
amphibious objects because he was recognizing the battle fields. Because he walked step
by step the whole battle field area. He knew the main amphibious objects and warned his
commanders. They didn’t listen to him. But, incidents and experiences proved him right.
The Turkish participated in Channakkale wars with 310,000 human force, the Brit-
ish with 460,000 and (according to the foreign sources 410,000) and the French with
79,000. In these wars, the Allied Powers suffered a damage of totally 180,000 human
force according to the Turkish sources (155,000 British and 25,000 French) and a dam-
age of totally 252,000 human force according to foreign sources (205,000 British, 47,000
French) The Turkish suffered a damage of 211,000 human force, 57.263 of which were
martyred (57,084 in the land wars and 179 naval wars), and the rest were injured, taken
PoW or lost.
The British discharged the regions of Anafartalar and Arıburnu on December 8-20,
1915 and the Seddülbahir region on December 28, 1915-January 9, 1916. The British
withdrew of their forces successfully due to the causes that discharging was very well-
planned, that they took care to be in secrecy and silence and that the weather conditions
were suitable.

9. Conclusion
Above all, the plans of the United Combined and Joint Fleet to capture Istanbul by
passing through the Straits failed and thus the fear of losing Istanbul, which was first
seen in governmental circles and also plead to the public, was removed. The naval vic-
th
tory on march 18 , encouraged the Turkish soldier in the land combats that were taking
place on the Gallipoli peninsula and returned the prestige of the Turkish Armed Forces.
The biggest gift of the Channakkale Victory to the Turkish Nation is certainly that it
has brought Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his military genius into light. Channakkale vic-
6 Department of the Army Headquarters, ibid, p.9-2
7 ibid, p.9-3