Page 342 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

342 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

Commanding Combined and Joint Operations:
The Gallipoli Model

Rhys CRAWLEY
1

he 1915 Gallipoli campaign was the first major amphibious operation of modern
T war. Initially conceived by Great Britain as a naval only campaign, its strategic
objectives were to defeat the Ottoman Empire and open a logistic route through the
Black Sea to Russia. With the failure of the combined British and French fleet to achieve
their objectives in February and March, the campaign turned into a combined and joint
2
operation. The British admiral, John de Robeck, requested the army’s assistance, and
command shifted to the experienced British general, Sir Ian Hamilton. The initial land-
ings on the Gallipoli coast on 25 April, and the subsequent fighting until allied forces
withdrew in January 1916, are early examples of large-scale multinational, inter-service
3
warfare. Against the Ottoman army, itself consisting of many nationalities was an allied
land-sea-air force from the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, India,
and Newfoundland. The Gallipoli campaign offers many insights into the challenges
of combined and joint operations. The most significant, though, are to be found in the
lessons of command. This paper explores the complexities of the allied command struc-
tures, personalities, relationships, and the practical challenges of command during the
Gallipoli campaign at the strategic and operational levels of war. 4

Strategic objectives
Both Britain and France had an interest in the Dardanelles and the Gallipoli penin-
sula long before the decision was made to attack the Ottoman Empire during the First

1 Dr Rhys Crawley is a postdoctoral fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, School of International,
Political and Strategic Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific, at The Australian National University. His first
book, Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive will be published by University of Oklahoma
Press in 2014. He attended 2013 International Commission of Military History Congress as a member of the
United States Commission for Military History.
2 Throughout this paper ‘combined’ refers to coalition warfare, while ‘joint’ refers to multiple services working
together in joint operations. While this contrasts the 1915 usage, it reflects contemporary terminology.
3 There are some excellent histories of the Gallipoli campaign. For an overview of the campaign, with particular
focus on the strategy and its flaws, see Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth, UNSW Press, Sydney,
2009. For an account of what it was like for the troops on the ground see, Peter Hart, Gallipoli, Profile Books,
London, 2011.
4 It is worth noting here that the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire was just as complex.
However, this aspect has been dealt with in much depth already, and is therefore not repeated in this paper.
For an excellent study of Ottoman command see, Edward J. Erickson, Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign,
Pen and Sword, Barnsley, 2010. Insights can also be gained from the memoir of the victorious German
general, who commanded the Ottoman Fifth Army at the Dardanelles. See, Liman von Sanders, Five Years in
Turkey, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, M.D., 1927.