Page 347 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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squadron, under Rear-Admiral Émile Guépratte, would come under the operational
command of Hamilton and de Robeck, respectively. Nonetheless, there were tensions in
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the alliance, and these largely grew out of the command arrangements.
Again, this was largely determined by the personalities of the individuals concerned.
Tensions came to a head in July, when Hamilton, who was busy preparing for his last
major offensive at Gallipoli (the August Offensive), continually rejected Bailloud’s al-
ternate plans. Already annoyed with this, Bailloud also felt that Hamilton had failed to
take him into his confidence about the forthcoming operations. According to the French
liaison officer on Hamilton’s staff, Major Marie René Jean de Bertier de Sauvigny, the re-
lations between the French and British commanders deteriorated, with General Bailloud
growing ‘more and more irate’. Finding a balance was difficult. Hamilton, who was
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acting on his penchant for secrecy, rather than a distrust of Bailloud, placed operational
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security above alliance politics. But given the circumstances, especially the continued
push by Bailloud to get involved, Hamilton should have given more consideration to the
opinions of his allies, and the challenges of commanding a combined operation.

Conclusion
There is no prefect command system. As the renowned American strategist, Colin
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S. Gray, noted: ‘there is no magic formula for successful command of an amphibious
operation – it may be unified, or it may be co-ordinated but sequential – what matters
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is that the key principles of essential unity of command should be followed’. As we
have seen, irrespective, although partially as a result of the system, there was no unity
of command either in London or the theatre, with respect to the Gallipoli campaign.
Amphibious operations, Gray continues, require integration and coordination of sea and
land warfare. ‘To launch a military operation from the sea requires an expertise that is
more than simply the sum of military and naval skills’. This expertise was found want-
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ing in both London and at Gallipoli in 1915. Added to this was the challenges imposed
on working closely with one’s allies in a combined operation, especially one as difficult
as the Gallipoli campaign.
Beginning with the strategic and political co-operation between Britain and France,
this paper has examined the command systems and some of the command challenges
faced in a combined and joint operation. The Gallipoli campaign provides an insight
into the varying national objectives of Britain and France; the flawed strategic direction
of the War Council; a lack of co-operation between Britain’s War Office and Admiralty,
which hindered operational command in the theatre; an absence of unity of command

29 Greenhalgh and Guelton, ‘The French on Gallipoli’, p. 228.
30 Quoted in ibid, p. 226.
31 Rhys Crawley, ‘The myths of August at Gallipoli’, in Craig Stockings (ed.), Zombie Myths of Australian
Military History, New South, Sydney, 2010, pp. 53-54.
32 Martin van Creveld, Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 9.
33 Colin S. Gray, ‘Amphibious operations’, in Richard Holmes (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Military
History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 52.
34 ibid, p. 49.