Page 606 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

606 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

• In parallel with this action, assault the PAIGC premises in Conakry, in order to
cause casualties and psychological damage, destroy material and release the 26
Portuguese military held captive by the movement.

Both parts of the mission had very different probabilities of success. The execution
of the coup d’etat would be favoured by the Portuguese raid, but the success of its ex-
ecution was very dependent on the performance of the FNLG force and its supporters
in Conakry. Moreover, in both cases – but in particular in what was concerned to the
coup d’etat – the reliability of the intelligence that would support the planning was of
paramount importance for the success of the operation.
Commander-in-Chief António de Spínola’s personal commitment in the operation is
fairly obvious in his letter, mailed from Bissau on the 12th of November 1970, and ad-
dressed to the Prime-Minister Marcelo Caetano (who replaced Oliveira Salazar, in 1968)
one week prior the beginning of the operation, in which the Portuguese Commander-in-
Chief clearly states:
«Personally, I assume full responsibility for the operation, running the necessary
risks, because I’m firmly convinced that, notwithstanding the unquestionable accom-
plishment in the scope of a social counter-revolution, we will irremediably lose Guinea
if we do not neutralize the enemy abroad». 1
Within the Portuguese government, the question was not peaceful, contrasting the
support granted by the Prime-Minister with the opposition expressed by the Defence
Minister and the Overseas Minister, both concerned with the international repercussion
of such a dangerous initiative.

Preparation
The capital city of the Republic of the Guinea has a sui generis configuration, due to
being located in a peninsula with an extensive isthmus. In the perspective of an amphibi-
ous attack, this configuration has the advantage of presenting all the targets at a short
range from the sea.
On the 17th of September 1969, when the final decision on the operation was still
pending, Alpoim Calvão led a reconnaissance operation to the city of Conakry, due to
the fact that the available intelligence (provided by the relevant Portuguese services)
was very insufficient and outdated. The reconnaissance operation was conducted by
the patrol boat Cassiopeia, previously disguised as a fishing boat. At 02H00, sailing
from the south, entered in the canal between the islands of Loos and Conakry and stood
poised in the most favourable point for collecting data through the radar, in particular the
shape and location of the new piers. At 03H00 the mission was considered completed
and Cassiopeia sailed back to base.
In January 1970, the operational base for the preparation of the operation was es-
tablished in the island of Soga, in the archipelago of Bijagós. Concurrently, the recruit-
ment and gathering in Soga of the FNLG combatants was initiated from their places of
1 ANTUNES, Freire, Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, Publicações D. Quixote, Lisboa, 1985, Vol. I,
p. 149.