Page 605 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

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ActA
We are going to present you the synthesis of the only operation of this type planned
by the Portuguese command, conducted during the twelve years that the conflict lasted
in Guinea-Bissau and that brought lasting and fatal consequences to the Portuguese re-
gime, already with a very weak position in the Concert of Nations. We refer to operation
“Mar Verde“ (Green Sea), carried out in November of 1970, in support to a coup d’etat
in the Republic of Guinea.
The idea of executing a larger incursion in the territory of the Republic of Guinea
arose in August of 1969, when a raid to release more than twenty Portuguese POW
(prisoners of war) held in captivity by the PAIGC in Conakry was for the first time con-
sidered. Another objective, that seemed easily achievable, was the destruction of the P6
and Komar patrol boats, owned by the PAIGC and the Republic of Guinea respectively,
which were posing a serious threat because they were significantly faster than those of
the Portuguese Navy, though they were very vulnerable to a surprise attack when docked
in the port of Conakry.
By the end of 1969, being already under way the planning phase of the operation, the
Portuguese military command in Bissau, led by general António de Spínola, learned that
the Portuguese government was maintaining contacts with dissidents of the president
Sékou Touré, since the summer of 1968. They hoped that Portugal supported a coup
d’etat to overthrow the regime in Conakry, at least with financial resources and weapons.
In return, they offered the establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal and the
liquidation of the PAIGC in Guinea-Conakry. At that stage of the negotiations, it was
not demanded to the Portuguese authorities to use the territory of Guinea-Bissau as the
departure base for the operation. Instead, the territory of Ivory Coast was envisioned.
Having the Portuguese government accepted to collaborate with the opponents of
Touré – where the “Front National de Libération Guinéen” (FNLG), headed by Paul
Dechanbenoit, stands out –, the idea of a raid gained the strategic dimension of a coup
d’etat, something that was not on the initial plans of the military command of Bissau.
The change of regime in Conakry and the agreed neutralization of the PAIGC in the
country would constitute a blow in the political and military capabilities of the pro-
independence movement.
The more than two years elapsed from the date of the first approach made by Guinean
dissidents to the government of Lisbon until the triggering of the operation clearly show
the doubts that the Portuguese authorities had regarding the capabilities of the rebels.
Therefore, the already existing planning to raid Conakry remained as the basis for the
operation.
From conception to final execution, the operation was always commanded by lieu-
tenant-commander Alpoim Calvão, a Marine Officer of the Portuguese Navy, backed up
by the Portuguese military command in Guinea and by the highest Portuguese political
authorities. From the declassified report of the operation, it is possible to extract the mis-
sion assigned to the force led by Calvão:

• To carry out a coup d’etat in the Republic of Guinea, in order to allow the rise
to power of a government favourable to the “high interests of the Nation”;