Page 632 - Le Operazioni Interforze e Multinazionali nella Storia Militare - ACTA Tomo I

632 XXXIX Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

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with the first one in Sofia in October 1964 . However, in the specific circumstances of the
early 1980s the task was brought to a leading priority for all intelligence and security services
with regular inter-departmental short term “situation analytical summaries”. What about the
termination of this particular task, the authentic documentary evidences confirm that in fact
KGB informed Sofia only in May 1990 that a new decision has been taken in Moscow for
21
“cease working on VRYAN operation” .
The newly available Military Intelligence records throw some new light on Warsaw Pact
views and estimates about NATO large scale exercises in the time of so called “Euro-missiles
crisis” in 1983-1984. The regular MI Information and Radio-Technical Departments’ ses-
sion, held in East Berlin in mid-January 1983 discussed the results of the reconnaissance
of AUTUMN FORGE-82 exercises and joint preparations for reconnaissance of WINTEX/
CIMEX-83 exercises. The East German delegation presented a proposal for introduction a
new system of early disclosure of NATO measures for alerting its joint forces from peacetime
to war. The Czechoslovak delegation shared new information about AUTUMN FORGE-82
scenarios at the Central European War Theater.
Soon after the session in East Berlin Bulgarian MI service informed the political, mili-
tary, and state leadership and Warsaw Pact Unified Command of new sensitive information
received from “reliable sources” in Brussels. One of those sources worked at the Secretariat
of NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns. Among the received information were the essence
of OPLAN Hula Bell for organization of “maritime communications” defense outside NATO
boundaries, approved by NATO Military Committee on 24 February 1983; a NATO Nuclear
Planning Group discussion on proposed deployment of US missiles in Belgium, the Nether-
22
lands and West Germany, etc . After two visits of Hungarian MI electronic experts in Bul-
garia in 1982-1983, in June 1983 an official agreement was signed between the two secret
services. It included dislocation of a Hungarian Radio Technical Intelligence group (10 to 15
servicemen) at Bulgarian Black Sea port Varna, and a Bulgarian Radio Technical group at
Dunaújváros, a Hungarian industrial center on Danube River .
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On 27 January 1983 Gen. Atanas Semerdzhiev, chief of Bulgarian General Staff ad-
dressed a proposal to his Soviet counterpart, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov for urgent convoca-
tion of extraordinary meeting of Warsaw Pact MI chiefs in order to discuss “the aggravated
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political and military situation” in Europe . However, such a meeting was not organized un-
til the end of 1983. Besides, no any session was carried out in the beginning of 1984 for im-
mediate discussion on ABLE ARCHER-83 exercise, which aim was “realistic staff training
and simulation in the terms of nuclear war”. Actually, in 1983 were carried out two summits
of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, one extraordinary session of Com-

20 Even in May 1962 an order by Bulgarian Chief of General Staff underlined “the primary task for successful
reflection to a sudden attack by the adversary”, while another order of 29 June 1967 defined the main goal
of the MI service as “duly warning about the preparation and organization of concrete actions for a sudden
attack with missile-nuclear weapons” by the armed forces of Greece, Turkey and Italy, and Sixth US Fleet in
the Mediterranean. - COMDOS, VR, Fond 23, Opis 0928, A.E. 983, p. 4, 43.
21 COMDOS, R, Fond 9, Opis 4a, A.E. 196, p. 26.
22 COMDOS, VR, MF No. 1684, A.E. I-1198.
23 COMDOS, VR, Inventory No. 2681. The agreement was in force until 1992.
24 COMDOS, VR, Fond 23, Opis 0928, A.E. 1278, p. 4.