Page 97 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 97

for the field-bridges caused delays on the Tagliamento and the Livenza, respec-
tively. Or would it have been possible to cut off the retreating Italian army with
the help of a parallel attack from Tyrol toward Southwest, and would as a con-
3
sequence the crossing of the Piave have become a possibility after all, and if
so, would a political decision of the Italian government in Rome in favour of a
ceasefire have still been possible? Principally, the hypothesis of a “missed op-
portunity” that had been recognized in hindsight and interpreted through various
perspectives could thereby be easily constructed. As a further consequence, the
halt or long wait of the Austro-Hungarian and German allies at the Piave was es-
pecially wildly discussed. Some have spotted Germany’s motives for this - based
on the German reduction of forces already instituted in November – speculating
4
that they wanted to save Italy from a complete and total defeat in order to keep
5
up an Austro-Hungarian front, thereby upholding their alliance . Some even saw
the command to stop as a personal intervention of Empress Zita, who might have
had a personal motivation based on dynastic reasons, as she was descended from
6
the House of Bourbon-Parma.
The newer historiography, however, shows a stronger judgement of the civil
and political circumstances, as well as their respective consequences, for the au-
tumn offensive against Italy. But here, too, individual aspects and their ramifica-
tions have been emphasized, especially in regards to the collapse of the Danube
Monarchy in the November of 1918. As an example, connections between the
transport and deployment of the attack troops creating a civil transportation and
energy crises (coal shortage)—because it tied up the Austrian-Hungarian railway
resources needed for food transportation—and the consequent need to care for
hundred thousand prisoners of war, in combination with the food shortage of the
winter of 1917/18, could be proven without a doubt. Therefore, the battle was
7
designated a “Pyrrhic victory”. Especially in regards to the events of November
1918—the collapse of the Central Powers and the victory of the Entente—the
question if these developments had not already found their beginnings and re-

Berlin 1937; Rudolf Hermanny-Miksch, Die Durchbruchsschlacht bei Flitsch im Oktober
1917, Hall o.J.
3 Die wichtigsten Kriegs- und Feldzüge der Weltgeschichte, S. 58; o.A., Bei Flitsch und am
Grappa. Die Möglichkeiten größerer Erfolge da und dort, Wien 1927
4 Edmund Glaise-Horstenau, Flitsch-Tolmein. Zum zehnten Jahrestage. In: Militärwissenschaf-
tliche Mitteilungen Nr. 58, Wien 1927, S.497-502, S. 500
5 Richard Fester, Die Politik Kaiser Karls und der Wendepunkt des Weltkrieges, Berlin 1924, S.
186
6 August von Cramon, Paul Fleck, Deutschlands Schicksalsbund mit Österreich-Ungarn. Von
Conrad von Hötzendorf zu Kaiser Karl. Sonderausgabe, Berlin 1932, S. 154-155
7 Manfried Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Österreich-Ungarn und der erste Welt-
krieg, Graz 1993, S. 503f, 509