Page 98 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

98 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

spective causes in the autumn offensive of 1917, which in turn would make the
revaluation of the results of the battle necessary, was pushed to the forefront.
Ultimately, however, based on these questions and contextualisations, it can be
assumed that the events which are clearly attributed to an operative layer, apart
from the fundamental decision to pursue the offensive, were also given an over-
all strategic dimension.
From the Italian perspective, Caporetto momentarily became a beacon. The
effects of the event could be felt immediately in the final phase of the offensive
and became evident on both governmental and individual levels. About two and
a half years after their entry into the war, which was actually originally regarded
as a decisive action for the conflict, the Italians did not only lack real military
successes to boast of, but were also driving the Entente into a major crisis to-
wards the end of 1917. Understandably, the national humiliation was followed
by personal consequences. The most prominent was the removal of Lieutenant
General Count Luigi Cadorna from his role as Chief of the General Staff of the
Comando Supremo and his relegation to a position in the Supreme War Coun-
cil in Rapallo. Additional dismissals and discharges followed. The investigative
committee, which was instituted as early as a few months later, brought signif-
icant flaws in organisation and leadership to light. “Caporetto” became synon-
ymous with complete defeat and, in the Italian post-war stories, was assigned a
kind of “damnatio memoriae” for a time. It was not until Mussolini that Cadorna
was allowed to redeem himself and admit defeat. However, this was directed less
towards Austria-Hungary than towards the German Reich, which was, by then,
both respected and viewed as superior.
The Piave was consequently even valorised and praised as a so-called “he-
ro-river”. The successfully conducted defence in November and December ulti-
mately served as the starting point to relativize the actual military consequences,
as French and British divisions, which numbered around 240,000 men, were al-
ready located in Italy towards the end of November 1917 and contributed signifi-
cantly to stabilizing the front and overcoming the military crisis. The military
8
events led to an actual political crisis, which resulted in the resignation of Paolo
Boselli and in a change of government in Rome towards the end of October
1917, even though a shift of the seat of government to Naples had previously
been considered, though not with the intention of striving for a ceasefire. The
new government of Vittorio Emmanuele Orlando managed to prevent the col-
lapse of the Italian government and army, even though it required a significant
amount of financial, material, and personal efforts as well as the mobilisation of

8 Franz Felberbauer, Die 12. Isonzoschlacht: Der Operationsplan und seine Durchführung. In:
Waffentreue. Die 12. Isonzoschlacht 1917. Katalog zur gleichnamigen Ausstellung im Öster-
reichischen Staatsarchiv in Wien, Wien 2007, S. 31