Page 100 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

100 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

The Italian army command, however, had already made a large mistake at
the war’s beginning: only to initiate the beginning of the offensive after hav-
ing reached the full level of combat readiness. The resulting delay provided the
commander of the newly formed Southwest Front, Archduke Eugen, with the
required respite to build up a defence front. This front reached from the Stelvio
Pass on the Swiss-Austrian boundary to the Adamello-Presanella Group, the
northern shore of Lake Garda, the Val di Fassa Alps and the Dolomites, the Car-
nic Crest, the Isonzo Valley and further to the Adriatic coast at Monfalcone.
The lynchpin of the Italian offensive efforts was at first the Isonzo area, which
was already attacked in the June of 1915 during the First Battle of the Isonzo in
the Gorizia and Doberdò regions. Despite considerable numerical advantages,
the Italians were unable to achieve the desired breakthrough against the bat-
tle-experienced and defence-ready Austro-Hungarian units. The Second Battle
of the Isonzo in the July and August of 1915 had the same objective and ended in
the same way, with the successful defence by the Austro-Hungarian Army. Until
the turn of the year, the breakthrough was attempted twice more (the Third Battle
of the Isonzo in October and November and the Fourth Battle of the Isonzo in
12
November and December). In order to give the badly struggling Austro-Hun-
garian front on the Isonzo some breathing room, a large offensive (“Strafexpe-
dition”) was set up for 1916 in the Folgaria-Lavarone area. This offensive was
meant to precipitate the escape from the mountains through a deep thrust. For
this purpose, not only were significant infantry forces concentrated in the area of
operations, but so were substantial amounts of artillery. However, a simultane-
ous intended attack on the Isonzo had to be omitted, as the German army could
not, nor wanted to, release their forces due to their own offensive at Verdun. The
offensive, whose start had to be postponed multiple times due to bad weather,
th
began on the 15 of May. Despite early success, Italian resistance grew ever
stronger through the allotment of appropriate reserves from the Isonzo. Ulti-
mately, the deciding breakthrough did not succeed, as a large-scale offensive on
the north-eastern front (General Alexei Brusilov) against Austro-Hungarian forc-
es located in Volhynia began in the June of 1916. This developed into a military
disaster as the offensive ran its course. To stabilise this section of the front, not
only did forces immediately need to be taken from the south-western front—by
then, all thought of continuing the South Tyrol offensive was unthinkable–but
German troops likewise had to be led there.
However, even the situation on the Isonzo front in 1916 was by no means
calm. In March of 1916, a spatially restrictive Italian offensive was carried out
against Mt. San Michele and near San Martino (the Fifth Battle of the Isonzo).

12 Miro Simcic, Die Schlachten am Isonzo. 888 Tage Krieg im Karst in Fotos, Karten und Be-
richten, Graz 2003, S. 43-61