Page 105 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 105

all other measures had to be subordinated. Within the framework of the classic
operative doctrine of area and time, the immediate threat in Italy would now be
cleared with the help of a temporary involvement of German troops, so that af-
terwards the decision could be faced again in the west.
Accordingly, the first preliminary approval of the First Quartermaster Gener-
al, General Erich Ludendorff, followed on the 5th of September, 1917. This was
also supported through a report by Krafft von Dellmensingen about the general
feasibility of the offensive operation on the Isonzo with focus on the area be-
tween Bovec and Tolmin. Waldstätten, who was again invited to Bad Kreuznach
th
on the 7th of September, could, on the 8 of September, telegraph the message,
“Brothers in Arms secured!” to the k.u.k Armeekommando at Baden. 24

Planning of the operation and deployment
Based on the generally promised commitments to a joint offensive and right
from the beginning, crucial questions about the incorporation and assembly of
German and Austro-Hungarian reinforcements headed to the Isonzo region were
asked. A new standing army under German command, which would receive
the number 14, should be included as assault troops in the northern section of
the Army Group Boroević. Their marshalling area zigzagged from the Smog-
ar Mountain, northeast to the Krn Mastiff to the Elevation of Loučná, about 5
25
km south of Tolmin, encompassing about 17km worth of front lines. In the
north, a subsequent operative roll was intended for a front line of about 2km by
the Bovec region (Rombon – Bovec Basin– Vrata – Smogar), wherefore it was
th
separated and made independent from the responsible k.u.k. 10 Army, but tac-
tically put under the control of the German 14 Army. Subsequently, the k.u.k.
th
1st Corps under General Alfred Krauß should have attacked in this region. These
were deployed from the Burkovina region, though his troops were originally
supposed to be partially replaced with Tyrolian divisions who were accustomed
to the mountains. 26
However, now the chain of command at a higher level needed to be resolved.
With his promotion to an Army Group and his responsibility for the Isonzo front,
which had, by then, already spanned many years, Colonel-General Boroević nat-
urally felt qualified also to lead the currently planned offensive. On the other side,
the command of the south-western front was held by Field Marshall Archduke
Eugene along with his responsibility for the entire Italian front. However, next

24 Ebda. S. 143
25 Österreichisches Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Kriegsarchiv (Hg.),
Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914-1918, 7 Bde, Wien 1930-1938, Band VI, Beilage 22
26 Alfred Krauß, Das Wunder von Karfreit. Der Durchbruch bei Flitsch, Berlin 1937, S. 19