Page 110 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

110 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

sten Heeresleitung. In this way, the six or seven German divisions used up al-
most the entire mountain-suited train material of the Southwest Front. Reserves
were barely available due to the lack of horses, whereby the delivery of horses
38
had to be forced from other fronts in turn.
As far as railway was concerned, this was impossible. Without hesitation,
civilian transport capacities were reduced to a minimum. The Head of Field Rail-
ways, Major General Emil Ratzenhofer and his deputy, Colonel Straub, had to
indicate in mid-October that only 10 to 20% of the necessary civilian transport
trains, which were needed to deliver the potato supply to Cisleithania, were able
to be organised. Through this, significant restrictions of food supplies as well as
the allocation of coal in the conurbations of the hinterland resulted, as the oper-
ation of the trains had to rely on civilian coal which was intended to be used for
heating.
yet still, the scope of the deployment seems immense from today’s perspec-
tive, despite negative consequences for the hinterland and numerous frictions.
Within 30 days, about 2,400 trains with about 100,000 carriages were deployed,
which corresponded to about 65% of the achievements of the march against Rus-
sia in the August of 1914.
Next to the amounts of troops and materials which needed to be brought to
their destinations, the screening of the preparations of the attack from the ene-
my presented a particular challenge. For this, too, considerable logistical efforts
were undertaken. So were for example German Alpenkorps troops deployed in
the area of Trento for a time, German mountain artillery temporarily deployed on
the Tyrolian Front, and German scouting troops undertook reconnaissance mis-
sions in the Carinthian sector. The later reactions of the Italians showed that these
measures barely justified the additional logistical measures. Though the Italians
naturally recognized the influx of troops and material, they assumed at the time
that merely a localized and limited attack was planned. However, the question
of aerial reconnaissance was much harder to plan. Until the decision to conduct
a joint offensive, the Italians had, more or less, an unrestricted air supremacy
in the operational area at their command. Beginning in the September of 1917,
merely 98 anti-aircraft guns were located in the entire region of the Command of
the Southwestern Front, of which 76 were divided amongst the Isonzo Armies.
In the area under the control of the later I. Corps, there were only two cannons,
th
and, on average, the later German 14 army had twenty cannons in active ser-
th
vice. By the 20 of October, the amount of cannons in the entire south-western
sector was increased to at least 142, due to their own reinforcements and through
39
allotments from the Germans. The six light (3.7cm), nine heavy (7.7cm), and

38 Schöckl, Isonzofront, S. 290
39 Armeeoberkommando, Offensive gegen Italien, Beilage 1