Page 106 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

106 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

to the German ally’s strong scepticism towards Boroević, who had until then
never led an offensive operation, but had merely defended, the Emperor, who
was known to personally occupy the position as Armeeoberkommandant (com-
manding army officer) of the k.u.k. Army, also had to be considered. Ultimately,
it came to a typical Austrian compromise solution, which took into account both
military and individual considerations. An insinuation of the new German 14th
Army had allowed the Army Group Boroević to grow onto three armies, which
had certainly presented a special challenge concerning leadership possibilities.
With the decision to appoint Archduke Eugene, who also represented a power-
ful historical symbolism as the representative of the archducal Italian Tuscan
lineage, a definitely acceptable General and a quite respected army leader, even
27
for the German allies, was chosen. At the same time, the Army Group Field of
Marshall Conrad, as well as those troops posted in Tyrol and in Carinthia, were
th
immediately put under the control of the k.u.k. 10 Army Armeeoberkommando,
a decision that strengthened their value considerably. Archduke Eugene’s army
front now encompassed the Army Group Boroević with the first and second Ison-
st
zo armies, the German 14 army, and the formerly directly led k.u.k. 1 Corps. 28
th
The preliminary directives of the k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando went to the
th
command of the south-western front on the 12 of September 1917 and created
the basic objective of the attack—reaching the former national boundary and
29
pushing the Italians back “if possible, behind the Tagliamento”. By the 18 of
th
September, the Command of the Southwestern front issued instructions to the
subordinated armies, assigning the main thrust to the German 14 Army support-
th
ed by a strong protection of the northern flanks by the k.u.k. 1 Corps as well as a
st
simultaneous support attack by the 2 Isonzo Army positioned in the South. The
nd
st
1 Isonzo Army however, which was located even more southward, was tasked
with hindering as many Italian deployments to the north as possible through
local operations, though they were not yet allowed to immediately engage in
attacks. Here it may already have come to initially ambiguously formulated in-
structions, which consequently led to a great deal of irritation in the Army Group
Boroević. This was due to the preamble of the army front command, in which
the simultaneous crossing of the “entire army front”–that is to say, of both Isonzo
30
armies–was to be ordered for the offensive. This “simultaneous operation” was
th
also adopted by the German 14 Army. While the purposes of the offensive were
entirely clear for the actual assault troops, numerous frictions and arguments
arose between the Command of the South-western front and the Army Group

27 Schöckl, Isonzofront, S. 147 f.
28 Felberbauer, Isonzoschlacht, S. 18
29 ÖSTA/KA AOK Op. I. Geh. 450/24 vom 12. 9. 1917, Fasz. 581 ex 1917
30 ÖSTA/KA NFA KdoSWF Op. Nr. 19.265 vom 18. 9. 1917