Page 111 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 111

the five heavy anti-aircraft platoon on German self-propelling artillery vehicles
played an exceptional roll in this due to their modern materials. 40
As it turned out, the Fliegerkompanien (airforce companies) and Fliegerstaf-
feln (airforce squadrons) proved to be of supreme importance in preventing both
enemy reconnaissance as well as the enemy’s attainment of important recon-
naissance. About 80 battle and reconnaissance airplanes were at the disposal of
the 16 available k.u.k. aircraft companies, though these were opposed by more
than twice the amount on the Italian side. The Germans were successful in gain-
ing air supremacy within a few days due to the transfer of three Jagdstaffeln
(fighter squadrons), eight Fliegerabteilungen (airforce squadron) and a Bomben-
geschwader (bomber squadron). The air activity of the Italians almost ceased
when the first deployment of German fighter planes, modern “Albatros” D.III
fighter, shot down numerous Italian Caproni-Bombers. This made it possible to
th
systematically scout out the entire attack zone of the German 14 Army and to
41
provide the maps with the current enemy situation. The most important result
th
of the aerial reconnaissance in the areas of the German 14 Army was the fact
that the Tagliamento had apparently not been prepared for defence on the Italian
side. This became the first indication that the goal of the attack, “over the Taglia-
mento and beyond” could become a reality. In the area of the Army Group Boro-
ević, but also by the Group Krauß, however, the aerial reconnaissance remained
insufficient. The promised Fliegerkompanie (airforce companies) arrived par-
tially too late, or not at all.

the Battle
th
The assembly of the attack units belonging to the German 14 Army and the
st
k.u.k. 1 Corps which, for the Italian theatre of war, took on immense dimen-
sions, was, as previously mentioned, clearly visible to the Italians. In addition,
the shifting of German troops temporarily to Tyrol and Carinthia, as well as the
issuing of German uniforms to k.u.k. troops, both intended as a diversionary
manoeuvre, were likewise ineffective.
At any rate, throughout the course of September, the Italian army came to
the conclusion that a further separate offensive over the Bainsizza Plateau and
beyond was impossible in the foreseeable future. The high number of casualties
th
in the 11 Battle of the Isonzo, as well as the difficult terrain circumstances of the
plateau, which were likewise worrisome for the Central Powers, in addition to
the replacement of missing amounts of ammunition, which took longer amounts
of time, allowed a justifiable dismissal of any thoughts of attack to emerge—at

40 Felberbauer, Isonzoschlacht, S. 21
41 Krafft, Durchbruch am Isonzo, S. 27