Page 107 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 107

Boroević, which could subsequently, if nothing else, be attributed to Boroević’s
personal animosities. The understandable discontent of having been weakened
by a decision to diminish the amount of heavy artillery troops and withdraw
them in favour of the attack area of Bovec-Tolmin was strengthened through the
“degradation”, of merely supporting the imminent offensive through an attack
from the south. The re-conquest of Gorizia, a prestigious target, was naturally to
be expected as the goal of the intended operation, although only as an indirect
st
target, because the town was situated in the section of the 1 Isonzo Army, which
was perceived as weak. Although a direct “Gorizia Operation” envisaged by Bo-
roević was subsequently no longer considered, the consequences of the “diplo-
matically” created hierarchical structure were very clearly brought to light in this
way. The instructions of the Command of the Southwestern Front to both Isonzo
Armies actually made the Army Group Boroević’s Command superfluous. This
Command now sought to compensate their leadership skills through exaggerated
interventions in the Operation Command of both Isonzo Armies, thereby mar-
th
ginalising the German 14 Army in regards to its free reign over operations (for
the time being). 31
The German 14 Army, as an essential element of the breakthrough, gradu-
th
ally shaped their own organisational ideas in regards to its structure and the ad-
mission of German and Austro-Hungarian formations on the basis of directives
from the 18 of September 1917, starting at the end of September and beginning
th
of October. Prussian General Otto von Below, an experienced army leader, was
named commander and was provided with Krafft von Dellmensingen, who was
already entrusted with the operational area, as Chief of General Staff, and Major
General Berendt as Chief of Artillery. For the execution of the previously es-
tablished attacks, three or four groups were created, who, named for their com-
mander, contained extensive corps strength. In the northern region of the attack
sector, the General Krauß Group (k.u.k. 1 Corps) stood with the k.u.k. 3 and
rd
st
nd
th
55 infantry divisions, such as the k.k. 22 Schützendivision. In addition to this,
the German Jägerdivision, formed of independent light infantry and storm battal-
ions, stood as a reserve. Furthermore, the group of Lieutenant General von Stein
(III. Bavarian Army Corps) with the German Infantry Divisions Nos. 12 and 117,
the division-strong Alpenkorps, and the k.u.k. 50 Infantry Division joined the
th
aforementioned units even into the area around Tolmin. The group of Lieutenant
General von Berrer (LI. Würtemberg Army Corps) was comprised of the Ger-
man Infantry Divisions Nos. 26 und 200, and was allocated an attack sector of
approximately 2km south of Tolmin by Lucija. The southern flank of the army
was comprised of the Field Marshall-Lieutenant Scotti Group (k.u.k. XV. Corps)
with the k.u.k. 1st and 13th Infantry Divisions (reserves) as well as the German

31 Schöckl, Isonzofront, S. 170-179