Page 112 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

112 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

least for the time being. An Austro-Hungarian counterattack on the Bainsizza
Plateau was expected instead. The Entente appreciated the shift of the offensive
less, as it was necessary to support the recent battles at Flanders in the West
through attacks on ancillary fronts. Therefore, it removed its heavy batteries,
42
which numbered about 200 guns, from their locations in the Italian army.
Lieutenant General Luigi Cadorna‘s decision to change his strategy to a tem-
porary defensive with the formation of strong reserves on the Tagliamento in
order to be able to stop offensives from both Tirol and the Isonzo region was
nd
not fully supported by the subordinated armies (2 and 3 Army) in its imple-
rd
mentation. Therefore, the setup of reserves on the Tagliamento, which was to
be supplied with troops provided by the two armies of the front, did not follow.
Likewise, the transition to the defensive echelons of the forces, which had man-
ifested itself in a relocation of the heavy and wide-reaching artillery, remained
nd
in the sections of the front. Especially the commander of the 2 Italian Army,
Lieutenant General Luigi Capello, was convinced that they could stop a possi-
ble offensive of the k.u.k. Isonzo army in its existing formation and strength at
any time, and could even take the critical Monte San Gabriele (Škabrijel) in a
counterattack. For this envisaged counter attack, it was nevertheless necessary to
leave the far-reaching artillery in the front positions in order to utilize their firing
range to its full extent. Although Cardona ultimately spoke against the planned
counter attack, the heavy batteries remained in their firing positions in the front
lines. Despite this “offensive” disposition of troops, which was maintained for
the entire 2 Italian army, the Corps directly on the front considered themselves
nd
strong enough to fight off any attack in the Isonzo section—a detrimental mis-
nd
judgement. The calculations regarding the comparative strength of the 2 and
rd
3 Italian armies envisaged by the Comando Supremo in Udine underlined this
trust, even with the possibility of German reinforcements factored in. Thus a nu-
merical advantage, in regards to infantry as well as artillery, was established on
the front line, to which additional strong army reserves were added. 43
Likewise, the fact that quickly deteriorating weather conditions developed as
the heat of the late summer gave way to a rapid fall in temperatures with rain,
th
thunderstorms, and strong winds beginning on the 6 of October, proved to be
beneficial, as it had a massive effect on the moral of the Austro-Hungarian front
line infantry. This also resulted in increasing desertions, which had remained
fairly rare up until that point. These cases occurred most frequently in the Tol-
min sector and in the northern flank of the German 14 Army, where, in addition
th
to the lower ranks and files, three Austro-Hungarian officers with nationalistic
motives deserted. On the 20 and 21 of October, these men gave relatively pre-
th
st
42 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, VI, S. 513 f.
43 Ebda. S. 517