Page 109 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 109

35
areas such as Russia and Romania. The amount of chemical weapons was as-
sumed to have been around 10%. This provision of ammunitions was considered
an unusually high proportion for the Austro-Hungarians, though in regards to the
proportions used by German batteries on the west front, it was substandard. The
German artillery was accordingly provided with significantly larger amounts.
Among the added German units, there was also the Pionierbataillon No. 35,
which was likewise assigned to the artillery, equipped as they were with their
modern chemical launchers. This battalion was to play an important role later, at
the breakthrough at Bovec. 36
In addition to infantry and artillery, technical formations, emergency medi-
cal installations, signal corps, and construction corps were sent to the marshal-
ling areas. These were to set up bivouacs, barracks, roads, trails, and infirmaries
next to field fortifications. Of course, these people had to be transported with
their equipment and building materials as well. All were to be fed, housed, and
equipped for the anticipated weather in the mountains. However, despite im-
37
mense efforts, they did not succeed in supplying every incoming troop with stur-
dy accommodations. In the marshalling areas, some even had to rely on tents.
The logistical hassle of the trains was also tremendous and surmounted the capa-
bilities of the Austro-Hungarians by far. Ultimately, the k.u.k. Armeeoberkom-
mando had focused on individual divisions regarding needs and requirements,
but they now had to deal with German artillery formations which were provided
with much larger ammunition allocations, and for which increased transporta-
tion efforts had to be factored in after the initial calculations. Ultimately, this
factor was either overlooked or underestimated during the conferences at Bad
Kreuznach. Instead of also addressing the specific topic of reinforcements for
logistics and transport with the German Supreme Army Command, the Germans
were promised the general provision of supply trains suited to mountains for the
newly arriving German divisions. The fact that the subsequently substantialised
German needs, however, proved themselves to be much higher than the k.u.k.
divisions had calculated was entirely unexpected and threw the calculations of
the commissariat and the subordinated commands into disarray. However, the
attempt not only to cap the generally promised provision of materials for the
mountain train, beasts of burden, and draught animals, but to conversely address
additional German motorcades, was nevertheless rejected by the German Ober-

35 M. Christian Ortner, Die österreichisch-ungarische Artillerie von 1867 bis 1918, Wien 2007,
S. 587
36 Felix Radax, Giftgas und das „Wunder von Karfreit“. In: Waffentreue. Die 12. Isonzoschlacht
1917. Katalog zur gleichnamigen Ausstellung im Österreichischen Staatsarchiv in Wien, Wien
2007, S. 49 f.
37 Armeeoberkommando, Offensive gegen Italien, S. 25-27