Page 104 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

104 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

On the other side, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Rich-
ard von Kühlmann, certainly had foreign policy reservations. He had been con-
sistently informed by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Ottokar Graf
Czernin, that the Danube Monarchy would likely not withstand the next winter,
neither materially nor militarily. With this, the danger of the Habsburg Empire´s
withdrawal from the alliance and from the war, perhaps through a separate peace
20
treaty, was of concern for him. However, similar concerns were shared by Ger-
man General-Lieutenant August von Cramon who was commissioned in the
k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando. 21
On another side, a successful offensive could possibly weaken Italy so that
it would either pose no further threat to Austria-Hungary or, like Russia, whose
withdrawal from the war was already underway, could request a separate peace
treaty. With this, the war goals of Austria-Hungary would be reached, and, like-
wise, the hazard of a discrete peace agreement with the Entente would also be
possible. In addition, a prestigious military success under the sole leadership of
Austria-Hungary with minimal German involvement could, in turn, be absolute-
ly detrimental to the general political dominance of Germany in the alliance, as
well as their dominance on specific topics, for example, on the question of Po-
22
land. Either way, the German side found themselves in a tight spot, a situation
that was without doubt intended by Foreign Minister Czernin, and was faced
with a dilemma concerning the choice of approach.
Ultimately, it fell on the German Imperial Chancellor and Prussian Minis-
ter-President, Georg Michaelis, to compare and contrast the possible advantages
and disadvantages, as well as evaluate the extent of German involvement on the
Isonzo with its possible consequences. Kühlmann’s fears regarding Austria-Hun-
gary‘s possible withdrawal seemed to him more likely if they did not take part,
for a collapse on the Isonzo would have military, as well as moral, effects on the
Danube Monarchy, and, therefore, consequences for the entire conduct of war.
Territorial shifting of the front could perhaps interrupt the connection to Bulgaria
and to the Ottoman Empire. Surely, the major offensive planned for the spring of
23
1918 on the western front would be endangered. The latter was ultimately the
deciding argument, in order to influence the decision in favour of involvement
with the German Emperor as well as for the German Supreme Army Command,
especially since the west front was deemed the deciding theatre of war to which

20 Lothar Höbelt, „Stehen oder Fallen?“ Österreichische Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg, Wien 2015,
S. 195 f.
21 August von Cramon, Unser österreichisch-ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weltkriege, Berlin
1920, S. 151
22 Imre Gonda, Verfall der Kaiserreiche in Mitteleuropa. Der Zweibund in den letzten Kriegsjah-
ren 1916 – 1918, Budapest 1977, S. 367
23 Schöckl, Isonzofront, S. 140