Page 103 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 103

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(Julian Alps), with a northern accompanying approach around Bovec was cho-
sen since it was the least heavily occupied region by the Italians.
Based on the calculated troop situation, Emperor Karl‘s request for assis-
tance from Emperor Wilhelm II now followed, although therein, significant
deviations, from both Schilhawsky’s planning and probably also from Arz von
Straußenburg’s vision, are evident. This was because Karl wished to replace
the Austro-Hungarian divisions with German troops in the east, in order to use
k.u.k. troops exclusively for the offensive. Only a supply of German artillery
was greatly desired. With this, they still wanted the war in Italy to be viewed as a
solely Austro-Hungarian affair, and a bold meddling of the German Reich would
be perceived as a humiliation of their own military self-image. For the Emperor,
it was likewise indeterminable to what extent the appearance of the German
divisions on “his” Italian front would adversely affect his peace initiatives with
respect to Paris and London. These deeply emotional concerns and doubts, espe-
cially owing to Karl´s character, were nevertheless already obsolete in the course
of the first basic military arrangements. However, as Major General Alfred von
Waldstätten, the chief of the operations department in the k.u.k. Armeeober-
kommando, travelled to Bad Kreuznach to the German Oberste Heeresleitung,
the imperial letters were opposed and the provision of German divisions were
still presented according to the Schilhawsky plan. There, Waldstätten received a
pledge that a thorough examination of the plan of operations would be conducted
at any rate, while the former commander of the German Alpenkorps, Lieutenant
General Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, together with three general staff offi-
cers, were dispatched first to the k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando at Baden and then
to the intended area of operations in order to make the feasibility of the operation
19
clear on site.
Emperor Wilhelm II’s first answer to Karl´ s request was issued on the first
of September and was just as vague as the commitments made to Waldstätten
in Bad Kreuznach. Nevertheless, it could be gathered from the letter that these
troops would only be granted within the framework of a joint offensive, and
thereby also joint leadership of the operation, provided there would German sup-
port granted at all.
These very strong restrictions and terms were owed to multiple consider-
ations. On one side, a simple allocation of German artillery groups without the
possibility of influencing military decisions seemed unbeneficial, while on the
other, there would barely be a possibility for achievement and prestigious suc-
cess alongside any tactical disadvantages.

18 Ebda. S. 133 f.
19 Konrad Kraff von Dellmensingen, Der Durchbruch am Isonzo. Teil I. Die Schlacht von Tol-
mein und Flitsch. In: Schlachten des Weltkrieges Band 12a, Berlin 1926, S. 14