Page 114 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

114 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

and mortar’s use of gas had to be determined so that the assault troops them-
selves would not be endangered by it. A waiting time of about 90 minutes after
the gas attack was considered enough to be excluded from the hazard. In order
to have useful visibility for the artillery’s fire control of highly explosive shells,
it was decided to wait for daybreak, which, according to observations in the
Tolmin area, was to be expected at 6:30 a.m. Consequently, two sudden barrages
were scheduled. A first barrage, beginning around 2 a.m., had to dedicate itself
especially to the second and third Italian defences, as well as to their artillery
positions, with the entirety of the gas ammunition. After a pause, which was in
part due to the time it took the chemical warfare agents to take effect, the reg-
istering and destruction fire of the entire artillery and mortar formation would
occur around 6:30 a.m. at first only on the Italian front lines, and then from 7 to
8 o’clock was expanded as an “observed fire” on all enemy positions. The be-
ginning of the infantry’s attack was scheduled for 8 o’clock. The k.u.k. I. Corps
Krauß was unsure of the effect of the at this site deployed chemical-launching
battalion (Pionierbataillon No. 35) as well as other effects of the artillery on the
mountain position, and therefore was guaranteed a longer interval in regards to
the end of the gas ammunition deployment and a two-and-a-half hour barrage
(The beginning of the infantry attack was at 9 o’clock). 49
The effect of the artillery fire on the 24th of October was ultimately non-uni-
form. The poor visibility through fog and drizzle in the morning worked on the
one hand to the advantage of the assault infantry, but they also made observation
of the artillery and fire positioning difficult. An envisaged artillery observation
from the air was entirely impossible. In this way, parts of the preparatory bom-
bardment went up in smoke. Some through misplaced points of detonation and
others because badly visible ground signals, panels or flags, which had partially
proved their worth in the east, made an adjustment to the offensive progress of
their own side impossible. Only signal rockets guaranteed a certain synchroni-
sation between infantry, artillery observers, and firing batteries. On the other
hand, the artillery fire of some Italian barrage fire batteries—provided they fired
according previously surveyed target maps— partially caused high casualties
within the attack columns and destroyed numerous communication lines during
the preparatory stage. Nevertheless, the importance of the massive artillery strike
cannot be underestimated, especially because the Italians had not previously ex-
perienced it from the Austro-Hungarian side. It is also undisputed that the sig-
nificance of the modern German gas ammunition cannot be underestimated in
this context. Diphenylchlorarsine (“Blaukreuz”) and Phosgene (“Grünkreuz”)
were used. The former acted as a cough triggering and irritating gas and caused
soldiers to tear off their gas masks, which were useless against these agents.

49 Schöckl, Isonzofront, S. 382 f.