Page 119 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 119

and then afterwards four armies were in active service in the first phase. Of these,
rd
nd
one (2 ) was essentially annihilated and one (3 ) had lost the majority of their
heavy equipment and was no longer considered capable of carrying out oper-
ations. As a precaution, the Italians had not sent the shattered and completely
demoralised parts of these two armies into service on the Piave. Instead, they de-
ployed fresh troops, which were subsequently joined by supporting British and
French formations. Here, the shortening of the length of the front line by about
240km proved to be an advantage as a continuous, staggered front line could
immediately be built up, despite the loss of an entire army. In addition, the sup-
ply line had been shortened by exactly the 150km which the Austro-Hungarian
and German allies had marched through after the successful breakthrough. The
breakthrough over the Piave would only have been possible with a new attack
operation, although locally, building bridgeheads had already been successful.
However, at this point, and as already mentioned, they lacked the forces, not to
mention the necessary artillery ammunition amounts, to do so. The attainment of
the Brenta line and the capture of Venice or even the march to the Adige and the
re-conquest of Verona, would have been understandably prestigious, though seen
purely from a military perspective, the circumstances had hardly been changed.
This was ultimately recognized by the German Supreme Army Command. Mere-
ly the attainment of the plain in the area of the Army Group Conrad would have
been valued as an advantage, though this would have equally affected the Ital-
ians and, in this, would have gone up in smoke. On the other hand, the front line
in the plain would have been significantly extended again. The Piave line was
very well suited to a further defensive line, though this advantage was offered
to both adversaries. The subsequent criticism made by numerous authors, espe-
cially Alfred Krauß, of the k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando and the German Oberste
59
Heeresleitung, who had missed a strategic chance through a sudden southern
thrust of the Army Group Conrad from Tyrol, came to nothing. Apart from the
unpredictable development of the breakthrough battle, which was actually mere-
ly planned as an offensive to achieve a respite, the movement of troops between
lowlands and mountains was impossible in a short period of time, as was more
than clearly shown by the later offensive in June. Even if it would have come
to a complete collapse of the Italian Army, the decision in the west would still
have persisted. The possible political consequences which could have resulted
from this, for example, an Italian withdrawal from the war or the beginning of
peace negotiations, allowed for excellent discussions then and still encourages
them today.
The withdrawal of the German troops, which began in the December days
of 1917, saw its first effects in that air supremacy was immediately lost to the

59 Vgl dazu: Alfred Krauß, Theorie und Praxis in der Kriegskunst, München 1936, S. 240 f.