Page 123 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017
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II SeSSIone - Il 1917.  ASpettI mIlItArI                            123



             the remaining Austro-Hungarian and German allies, as with Bulgaria in the year
             1916, was no longer possible due to the already implemented standardization of
             the system. Consequently, the k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando issued a directive, on
             the basis of the materials which had been found, that batteries of four guns each
             could only be formed when each piece of artillery could be provided with at least
                                       68
             1,000 rounds of ammunition.  This especially affected medium and heavy artil-
             lery from 10.5 cm to 28 cm. Captured anti-aircraft guns on motor vehicles were
             especially valuable and were immediately added to the capturer’s own defence
             batteries.
                Consequently, only a fraction of the captured artillery could actually be used.
             In the fall of 1918, many cannons, especially older kinds, found themselves ex-
             actly where the Italians had abandoned them the previous year. At the end of the
             war in 1918, the inventories of the current situation reported only about 229 cap-
             tured pieces of artillery (in addition to Italian, also those of French and Russian
             origin). At this point and time, there were about 829 pieces of artillery located in
             the hinterland and in the depots for the plunder. 69
                Even so, next to the immense number of captives, the amount of captured
             pieces of artillery acted first and foremost as propaganda.
                                                                70
                The elation of the military success naturally had its effects on the land be-
             hind the front lines. Among other things, a war loan, which had been available
             for subscription in the beginning of November 1917, was advertised with the
             achieved military success and found a ready market. Only the military was truly
             aware of the possible consequences which the danger of the (early) collapse on
             the Isonzo posed and which was ultimately averted within the framework of the
             offensive. Besides the already mentioned propagandist effect, the “Miracle of
             Kobarid” did not result in immediate consequences on daily life for the hinter-
             land, except perhaps for the inhabitants of the Istrian coast and Trieste. In con-
             trast to this, the ceasefire of the 18th of December in the east seemed of epochal
             significance, awakened hopes and expectations, and thereby quickly covered up
             the events at Bovec and Tolmin.








             68  ÖSTA KA AOK Op. Nr. 80075
             69  Ottokar Pflug, Bewaffnung und Munition, Wien 1923. Ungedr. Manuskript in ÖSTA KA, S.
                250
             70  Vgl. dazu die Tagebucheinträge Josef Redlichs vom 28. Oktober bis 3. November 1917. In:
                Fritz Fellner (Hg.), Schicksalsjahre Österreichs 1908 – 1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef
                Redlichs, 2 Bde., Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs Nr.
                40, Graz 1954, II., S. 240 f.
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