Page 120 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

120 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

Italian air force, which was additionally strengthened by British and French air-
planes. The afflux of Entente troops was also associated with the material and
tactical standards of the west front, which the former forces brought to the front
lines. The tactical advantage of the modern method of warfare from the October
of 2017 therefore went up in smoke. In addition, under British and French influ-
ence, the Italian army located by the Piave, immediately converted to the modern
so-called Zonenkampfführung, whose effectiveness was clearly felt during the
Piave offensive in the June of 1918. On the other hand, Bovec-Tolmin was asso-
ciated with a significant gain of experience for the German troops as well. From
the planning of the artillery strikes to the “efficiency” of the gas use, and even to
the testing of the assault troop method, the breakthrough battle could be viewed
as a kind of “dress rehearsal” for the spring offensive in the West. Some lessons,
such as the need to allocate definite paths for the attack units to move in were
actually implemented in the spring of 1918.
There are no exact or verifiable numbers in regards to the casualties of the al-
lied German and Austro-Hungarian forces. The calculations of the Austrian Gen-
60
eral Staff accounted for about 70,000 dead, wounded, missing, and sick men
and it can be assumed that these numbers were less than those during the Tenth
Battle of the Isonzo, even taking a corresponding lack of exactness into account.
As a result of the great success, the Command of the Southwestern Front and,
also, of course, for the k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando compiled the factors which
led to its success. Among these was Schilhawsky’s plan, which was outstanding
in regards to the choice of attack point, and which specified the basic concept
and the calculation of forces, even if its details were later amended and adapted.
Furthermore, a noticeable moral crisis within the Italian army, which was due
to battles with heavy losses, was associated with a palpable individualism of
the medium level of command, particularly in the army commands, during the
run-up to the offensive. In addition to this, the unique Austro-Hungarian forma-
tions and concentrations of artillery and ammunition, the speedy deployment, the
surprise which was reached through the former, and the rainfall which was very
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useful for the infantry attack, were beneficial on the 24 of October. Regarding
the actual implementation, however, the German involvement remained deci-
sive. Not only the achievement of air supremacy in the assembly period, the use
of modern German equipment, and the effective poison gas, but also the modern
fighting method of the West front and the flexible leadership methods in the
attack, proved to be advantageous over the rigid Italian conduct of operations.
“Caporetto” was viewed in numerous memoirs and accounts as a victory which
was only made possible by German involvement, though the exact analysis of
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the events of the 24 to the 26 of October proves this to be incorrect. Many of
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60 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg VI, S. 713