Page 117 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017
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II SeSSIone - Il 1917.  ASpettI mIlItArI                            117



             in the night of the 28th of October, the extensively destroyed Gorizia was recon-
                                     57
             quered further in the south.
                                                                                  nd
                At this point, about 200,000 prisoners had already been brought in. The 2
             Italian army was largely shattered and the 3  Italian army endeavoured to reach
                                                    rd
             the Tagliamento, leaving behind artillery and equipment. Subsequently, on the
             28  of October, the k.u.k. 10  Army belonging to the Army Group Conrad, could
                                      th
                th
             also successfully join the offensive on the Carinthian Front. Through this, they
             succeeded in exiting the mountains and reaching the Friulian Plain. The entire
             Italian forces between the Carnic Crest and Adria partially found themselves in a
             panicked retreat. The deployment of the Italian reserves was uncoordinated and
             therefore they often ran straight into the spearheads due to the chaotic circum-
             stances. Still others could not move forwards due to the completely congested
             roads.
                With this, the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, the “Breakthrough at Bovec-Tol-
             min” or “Caporetto” was de facto ended in the official military historiography.
             The battles to reach the Tagliamento and the Piave, respectively, were merely
             presented as “pursuit battles” in the military historiography, though they were no
             less dramatic. Having reaching the Tagliamento in sight, the German Supreme
             Army Command’s predefined operational goal in regards to the support which
             was granted through German troops was reached, and a fundamental decision
             concerning further procedures was necessary. Here, different approaches devel-
             oped between the k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando and the Command of the South-
             western front. Archduke Eugene did not under any circumstances want to let the
             possibility of a further shattering of the Italian Army, either west or east of the
             Tagliamento, slip away unexploited. In this, he found himself in accord with the
                                                            th
             subordinated commands, particularly the German 14  Army. On the other hand,
             German requests for compensation in the form of a large offensive in the west,
             which was planned for the spring, appeared to have been made possible by the
             obvious military success. The deployment of k.u.k. troops on the west front ap-
             peared to have been daunting for both Emperor Karl, because of the undeniably
             worsening relationship with France, as well as for Arz von Straußenburg from
             a military respect. Ultimately, the approval for the continuation of the offen-
             sive fell after the already completed military manoeuvres. The Command of the
             Southwestern front had the eastern shore of the Tagliamento reinforced and tried
             to build a bridgehead on the western shore even before approval from the k.u.k.
             Armeeoberkommando. At this point, chaotic scenes took place on the eastern
             shore of the Tagliamento, especially when numerous wooden bridges and piers
             were torn down by flooding and thousands of Italians were unable to retreat. At
             the remaining crossing points, drumhead trials were held to filter out alleged de-


             57  Armeeoberkommando, Isonzoschlacht, S. 11-13
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