Page 113 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 113

cise indications about German artillery assemblies, attack objectives, the start-
ing time of the attack, and the employment of German poison gas, which was
44
recorded and forwarded by Italian intelligence officers. That these significant
statements, both in regard to their reality and especially to their dimensions, were
not assessed as significant appeared to be linked with the repeated postponement
of the offensive’s begin in addition to the previously mentioned feeling of supe-
riority. After the first preliminary designations in the second third of October, the
st
date of October 21 was determined due to the transportation difficulties during
the assembly of troops—that is to say, all units had until then to reach a state of
complete tactical readiness and to confirm the completion of their preparations
with the Command of the Southwestern front. Nevertheless, problems arose for
st
the Army Group Boroević as well as for the k.u.k. 1 Corps, which should have
been provided with reinforced artillery due to their increasing importance as the
45
northern flank group. However, logistically they were still bound to the k.u.k.
th
10 Army. The time of attack was subsequently postponed to the 22 of October.
nd
th
Ultimately, the German 14 Army requested a further postponement, to which an
th
additional delay of 24 hours was added, and, with this, the 24 of October was
finally determined. These changes were, of course, not relayed to the desert-
46
st
ing officers, so that the attack which was awaited on the 21 of October never
happened and certainly cast doubt onto the credibility of their statements. Nev-
ertheless, this “betrayal” was exaggerated by the Command of the Southwestern
Front even during the war due to captured records and reoccurred in numerous
post-war reports. 47
rd
In the night hours of the 23 and 24 of October, Groups “Stein” and “Ber-
th
rer” now moved three German divisions into their assault positions and relieved
the Austro-Hungarian trench infantry positioned there. The replacement was not
recognised by the Italians and therefore ran smoothly.
The employment of artillery in the breakthrough zones of Bovec and Tolmin
th
was planned by the Head of Artillery of the German 14 Army, Major General
Berendt, introducing a new procedure corresponding to the tactical concepts of
the German Lieutenant Colonel of Artillery, Georg Bruchmüller. A barrage of
48
artillery fire, which wasted immense amounts of artillery, was no longer to be
applied. Instead, a sudden barrage, which was shorter by west-front standards,
though overall fiercer, was to be fired from all guns. Furthermore, the artillery’s

44 Schöckl, Isonzofront, S. 358-361
45 ÖSTA KA NFA KdoSWF Op. Nr. 25.901 vom 10. 10. 1917
46 Schöckl, Isonzofront, S. 374-376
47 Vgl. dazu: Österreich Ungarns letzter Krieg VI, S. 516
48 Christian Stachelbeck, Militärische Effektivität im Ersten Weltkrieg. Die 11. Bayerische In-
fanteriedivision 1915 bis 1918. Zeitalter der Weltkriege Band 6, Paderborn 2010, S.156