Page 115 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

II SeSSIone - Il 1917. ASpettI mIlItArI 115

Phosgene, however, acted as a deadly lung poison. After both gases were mixed
with Austrian C Substance (Cynogen Bromide), and simultaneously deployed
(“Buntschießen”), a corresponding effect was achieved. The outdated Italian gas
50
masks (“Polivalente”) proved ineffective against the German gases, to the point
where the use of gas led to a panic-like abandonment of positions. In the area of
the Bovec sector, the use of the German chemical launchers (Gaswerfer) there-
fore proved to be a decisive factor: the reserve of an infantry battalion, which
could not have been fought with artillery, was completely disabled with over 600
casualties. 51
Nevertheless, the infantry was to bear the brunt of the battle, especially on
the first day of the battle, because, as previously mentioned, the signal com-
munication to the artillery batteries was partially interrupted through the Italian
barrage. The attack troops were expanded, trained, and instructed in the special
circumstances of trench warfare in its linear phase, which meant that forces were
distributed among two to four trench complexes, each two to three kilometres
apart from one another, most commonly organised in three battle lines. The
52
battle strategy now saw extended assault troops in the attack, which were sup-
posed to quickly overcome the no man’s land and to enter the line of the first
position in order to show the following attack troops the way. Speed was of
paramount importance in this in order to prevent the defenders from occupying
53
the foremost trench by the end of the preparatory fire. The training on this front
had already been optimized in the German Army, beginning in 1916, and was
successfully and gradually applied at the end of 1916 and beginning of 1917 in
the k.u.k. Army as well. Separate storm battalions were formed and became the
bearer of both the new idea of assault troops and of training units. These were
generally not closed and instead distributed amongst the attack columns, further-
54
more forming the first lines of the attack. Subsequently, special attention also
had to be paid to the factor of time. The trench infantry which was overthrown
in these positions were not to be given any opportunity to re-form or to interdict
the breakthrough areas.
If nothing else, this procedure of attack made it possible for the spearheads
to win massive amounts of territory, even on the first day. The procedure was
then barely known by the Italians and presented a massive difference in com-

50 Wolfgang Zecha, „Unter die Masken!“ Giftgas auf den Kriegsschauplätzen Österreich-Un-
garns im Ersten Weltkrieg. Militärhistorische Dissertationen Bd. 13, Wien 2000, S. 122-124
51 Rudolf Hanslian, Der chemische Krieg, Berlin 1927, S. 145
52 M. Christian Ortner, Sturmtruppen. Österreichisch-ungarische Sturmformationen und Jagd-
kommandos im Ersten Weltkrieg. Kampfverfahren, Organisation, Uniformierung und Ausrüs-
tung, Wien 2005, S. 34-41
53 Ebda. S. 178 f.
54 Ebda. S. 188-191