Page 116 - Il 1917 l'anno della svolta - Atti 25-26 ottobre 2017

116 il 1917. l’anno della svolta

parison to the previously practised, frontal skirmishing line tactic, in addition to
noticeably reducing the defensive power of the machine gun. On the evening of
th
October 24 , the front from Bovec to Tolmin was torn open in a width of 32km.
The “Krauß” group had significant difficulties due to diminished effectiveness
of the artillery, though they had already pierced through the second line against
Žaga, while the group “Stein” already stood west of Kobarid. The “Berrer” and
“Scotti” groups, who were to attack in the difficult mountain terrain, achieved at
least a breakthrough to the second line. 55
Nevertheless, there were numerous frictions and problems. The attack of the
northern flank of the 2 Isonzo Army largely failed and other parallel operations
nd
were also partially marred by difficulties. Especially in the Tolmin area and by
Lucija, quickly supplying the spearheads with reinforcements and ammunition
was unsuccessful due to the overstraining of the poor paths and roads. In these
confined areas there were numerous tailbacks and congestions. In addition, arbi-
trary actions began to develop, which could be attributed to the lack of leadership
th
on the part of the German 14 Army as well as the Corps Command.
The Italian Comando Supremo, however, was faced with similar difficulties.
Little could be learned about the positions now actually occupied by the ene-
my due to the destroyed telephone lines, merely that a massive attack between
Bovec und Tolmin was apparently in motion. Appropriate reserves were immedi-
ately set in motion in order to strengthen important points, such as the Kolovrat
Ridge in the attack area of the “Stein” group. At the same time, there was a ner-
vous reaction and, in regards to the 2 Isonzo Army, which was unsuccessfully
nd
attacking, it was decided to withdraw the troops to a front line position located
56
further back.
However, at this point, the deep breakthroughs of the attack groups had mere-
ly triggered a repression of the Italian front. A decision had not yet been achieved
by any means. For the 25 of October, the flanks of the spearheads, which each
th
pushed forward to different distances, had to be secured, and the breakthrough
areas had to be widened. Again, speed was the foremost principle in the area of
th
the German 14 Army.
In the course of the 25 of October, this was more or less to succeed in all
th
sections. The “Krauss” group succeeded in taking the Stol Ridge and the “Stein”
group had succeeded in taking the Kolovrat position. Ultimately, Monte Matajur
was also taken. Until then, already around 23,000 men had been taken as prison-
ers of war by the German 14 Army. On the 26 of October, both spearheads of
th
th
the Bovec and Tolmin regions were more or less united, and the 2 Italian line
nd
th
was broken to a large extent, on the 27 of October Cividale del Friuli fell, and
55 Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg, VI, S. 533
56 Ebda. S. 535