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IV Sessione - L’Italia a Versailles. Aspetti di politica internazionale 281

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gence. It is interesting to note that the German military’s strong interest in the
problem of German-Austrian national defence was a continuation of First World
War politics, especially since the German General Staff had already become
proactive in late 1914 and then again in spring of 1915 about taking control of
Imperial and Royal troops, particularly in the East. This went as far as using the
Bavarian alliance treaty with the German Empire from 1870 as a model case for
an eventual Habsburg contingent within a pan-German army. This was clearly
rejected at the time but subsequently developed into a joint “supreme war com-
mand” by way of a joint “high command east.” It was the German wish to follow
up by signing a military convention, however, this was prevented by the end of
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the war but meant a continuous loss of Austro-Hungarian autonomy. The idea
of an Austrian contingent within the army of the German Empire now seemed
realistic to both sides and was politically confirmed in a written agreement, the
so-called Berlin Protocol, between the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Otto
Bauer and German Foreign Minister Ulrich Count Brockdorff-Rantzau in early
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March 1919. This political willingness relatively soon turned into military (as
opposed to political) activities, such as sending German-Austrian officers and
soldiers to Germany to be taught German service regulations and combat tactics
or the participation of several members of the State Office in consultations about
the organisation of future armed forces in Weimar in June 1919. However, the
latter had to return home after the first conditions for peace handed over in Paris
on 16 June had become known to the public. 30
The already mentioned Colonel Schneller was supposed to consult the Ger-
man-Austrian delegation in military matters during the peace negotiations and
had been given instructions and directives by the State Office. These guidelines,
decisively written by Körner, contained relatively complex issues, especially since
the future national territory of German-Austria had not yet been specified. It
was not intended to already prejudge if one was allowed to join the German Em-
pire or if this was to include German-Bohemia, to leave some room for negoti-
ations. Körner nevertheless demanded fundamental equality of treatment with

27 Theo Schäfer: Die Genesis der Anschlußbewegung und die Anschlußdplomatie 1918-1919,
Phil. Diss, Vienna 1970, p. 208
28 Broucek, Militärische Vorbereitungen, p. 217-220

29 Schäfer, Genesis, p. 321
30 Broucek, Militärische Vorbereitungen, p. 222