Page 286 - Il 1919. Un’Italia vittoriosa e provata in un’Europa in trasformazione. Problematiche e prospettive - Atti 11-12 novembre 2019

284 Il 1919. Un’Italia vittoriosa e provata in un’Europa in trasformazione

until 1935, with only the inner structures being changed time and again. The
strong fluctuation of personnel between the brigades also was the result of the
March 1920 law stipulating different quotas for each of the federal states. Vienna
was earmarked for 9,000, Lower Austria for 6,500, Upper Austria and Styria for
4,000 each, Tyrol and Carinthia for 1,700 each, Burgenland for 1,500, Salzburg
36
for 1,000 and Vorarlberg for 600 men. Equipment and weapons of the units
also were rigorously restricted, and not just in terms of quantities. 34,500 repeat-
ing rifles, 216 light, and 254 heavy machine guns, 60 mortars (up to a calibre of
14 cm) as well as 90 artillery pieces up to a calibre of 10.5 cm were admitted.
Aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, chemical warfare material, and armoured vehicles
37
were banned. The maximum stock of ammunition was fixed at two million live
military rounds. However, the Austrian Army Administration calculated an esti-
mated annual need of six to eight million rounds for training purposes. The am-
munition shortage was met with so-called “target practice rounds” (with a
soft-point bullet), a haunting variation of the 8 mm round in use, to which the
fixed quota of the Entente did not apply. Artillery ammunition was limited to
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1,000 rounds per gun. An Allied military commission was watching over the
disarmament measures until 1928, however, especially in its last years of existence
it rarely ever put its foot down anymore and quietly tolerated the creation of
“black stockpiles” as a consequence of arms seizures, mostly from the Social
Democratic Schutzbund (1927). Thereby the number of small arms and machine
guns of the Bundesheer almost doubled.
Transfer of personnel from the Volkswehr to the new army according to the
clauses of the Treaty of Saint Germain within the framework of the National
Defence Act of 1920 was more difficult than expected. Naturally, the establish-
ment of a professional army with a minimum service length of six years led to
an explosion of expenditure for active service troops, which was another reason
why a total strength of 30,000 men could not be reached before 1935 and that it
even dropped to 22,000 men in 1932. This was to have significant consequences
39

36 Verordnungsblatt des Staatsamtes für Heerwesen Nr. 8 vom 22. Februar 1919
37 Erwin Steinböck, Zur Organisation des Ersten Bundesheeres. In: Das Bundesheer der Ersten
Republik 1918-1938. Teil 1: Organisation und Bewaffnung, Vienna 1991, p. 8
38 Kristan, Geschichte Generalstabes, p. 38
39 Jedlicka Ludwig, Ein Heer im Schatten der Parteien. Die militärpolitische Lage Österreichs
1918 – 1938, Graz 1955, p. 73