Page 394 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

394 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

views on Belgium, since Germany had retained an interest in the radical Flemish Movement
and Flanders after 1918, under both the Weimar and the Nazi Governments, and had been
subsidizing Flemish nationalist magazines and movements. As part of the so-called West-
forschung (the scientific or popular-scientific research on countries of Northwest Europe,
especially the Netherlands and Belgium, by German scientists and institutes) networks of
Flemish nationalists and German “Flamenfreunde” had arisen . This pro-Flemish policy had
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strategic imperatives: pulling Belgium, dominated by French culture and French-speaking
elites, out of the French cultural and political orbit.
Hitler, however, did not want any discussion about the future for the duration of the war.
He was influenced by the fact that Leopold III - whose mother Elisabeth was of German
origin and whose sister Marie-José was married to the Italian Crown prince Umberto - had
stayed in the country as a “prisoner”. If a German victory ever became final, Belgium would
most probably be divided in a Reichsgau Flandern and a Reichsgau Wallonien (Himmler
th
made declarations to that effect). Also on the 14 of July, Hitler instructed that the Flemings
were, “as much as possible”, to be given more advantageous treatment. Consequently, Flem-
ish prisoners of war were liberated, whilst Walloons remained in the Oflags and Stalags.
Moreover, the Military Administration supported the Flemish Nationalist VNV, to counter
the influence of the traditional elites, though, contrary to World War I, this was not simply
a choice in favour of Flemish Nationalists, but should be seen as part of a broader support
of New Order movements. That this support favoured the Flemish VNV over the Rex Party
of Walloon Léon Degrelle – an authoritarian offshoot of the Catholic Party, moving in an
increasingly fascist direction – can be explained by two facts. One is that the VNV, because
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of its mixture of Fascism and Flemish Nationalism, was more firmly rooted in society than
Rex (VNV got about 15% of the (Flemish) vote in 1939, Rex less than 5% (of the Walloon and
Brussels vote)); the other is that Reeder initially mistrusted Degrelle as a mountebank. VNV
people were to be nominated, partly in the central administration, in newly created semi-
governmental bodies and most of all at a local level. In 1944, 70 % of Flemish Mayors were
VNV; Rex could only claim 13% of Walloon mayors .
16
In exchange for these nominations, the VNV had to abandon its strategically unusable

14 Burkhard Dietz, Helmut Gabel, Ulrich Tiedau (hrsg.) Griff nach dem Westen. Die “Westforschung” der
völkisch-nationalen Wissenschaften zum nordwesteuropäischen Raum (1919-1960). 2 vol. Münster, 2003
(articles about Belgium by Winfried Dolderer, Marnix Beyen, Björn Roszka & Barbara Henkes).
15 On the evolution of Rex and its leader Léon Degrelle (who was as colorful as he was unscrupulous), see:
alain Colignon. Degrelle, Léon, in: Nouvelle biographie nationale, vol.VI, Brussels, 2003, p. 111-123. Also
Francis BalaCe, La fin de l’équivoque du rexisme: l’élection partielle du 11 avril 1937, in: Les “Ca me
dit” de l’histoire. En mémoire et pour comprendre les années 40. Tintigny, 1991, p.122-123: “fascisation
progressive de Rex avec le développement des milices…”. These articles, as well as the older work by Jean-
Michel Etienne, Le mouvement rexiste jusqu’en 1940, Paris, 1968, prove that the transmutation of Rex from
a catholic authoritarian and corporatist party to a fascist one dates from after 1937. On its wartime evolution:
Martin Conway. Collaboration in Belgium. Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement 1940-1944. New Haven
& london, 1993.
16 On the fascist take-over of power at the local level: Nico Wouters. Oorlogsburgemeesters 40/44. Lokaal
bestuur en collaboratie in België. Tielt, 2004. 750 p. In English: Municipal Government during the Occu-
pation (1940-1945): A Comparative Model of Belgium, the Netherlands and France. in: European History
Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 221-246.