Page 396 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo I

396 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

hand – solidarity with the Allies versus the more national and heavily economic interpreta-
tion of the national interest by Galopin.
His main aim was to steer the Belgian economy through these turbulent years without too
much damage and to preserve the Belgian economy from major upheavals or fundamental
changes to its structure. His policy was officially justified and, at least in part, also sincerely
motivated by two facts: that Belgium was dependent on Germany for the import of food-
stuffs, as the 14-18 scenario of foreign food aid was no longer possible; and that otherwise
workers would be deported, as they had been in 1916. Only the production of weapons and
ammunition in the strict sense was refused – the famous FN (Fabrique Nationale) at Herstal
was put under Kommissarischer Verwaltung – but nothing else, though semi-military orders
were systematically delayed and in general one always had to strive to work as much as pos-
sible for the internal market. Galopin knew well enough, and admitted openly, that in total
war, deliveries of materials such as crude steel could be as important to the enemy as those
19
of weapons and ammunition, but he had to draw the line somewhere, and, as he put it in
the paternalist language typical of his age and class, producing “weapons and ammunition”
would offend the workers’ sense of honour.
He more or less received the support of heavy industry. However, in other sectors, such
as the textile industry, there where many small businesses whose bosses, in Flanders espe-
cially, were often sympathetic to the New Order, and had fewer qualms about working for
the Germans. Not only were they more willing, they were also subjected to more German
pressure, as scarcity of raw materials was especially acute in the textile industry. Less will-
ing businessmen therefore had a harder struggle to say no to the Germans than did those in
heavy industry, where the power of holding companies was a force to be reckoned with. The
“Offices centraux” or commodities offices (charged with the distribution of raw materials)
and “Groups”, introduced on the German model, would be staffed, on the one hand, with
traditional figures in the sectors dominated by the holdings; the head of the Textile Office, on
the other hand, was a Nazi collaborator. The man who had been appointed Secretary General
of Economic Affairs, and who had been close to the VNV would, however, gradually move
towards the Belgian establishment, to the frustration of the VNV.
Influential as Galopin and his group may have been, their power was of course very lim-
ited. To say that they could only react to German policy is to state the obvious, but that makes
it no less true. They operated within the framework of a German-led European economy, cut
off form its overseas outlets and raw materials. Berlin faced the fact that occupied Europe
had a serious deficit of resources, including cereals and coal, the latter especially in the case
of France, Germany’s biggest prize in Western Europe. As a net coal importer, Belgium saw
about 20% of its production disappear towards France, Luxemburg and the Reich. Since iron
ore deliveries from Alsace-Lorraine were also no longer available, France taking precedence,
this impacted significantly on the level of Belgium’s iron and steel production. Such basic
facts determined the level of production as much as did changes or nuances in the attitude of
Belgian business. They also escaped the power of the Militärverwaltung, whose occasional
pleas to let Belgium dispose of more of its own raw materials were rarely successful.

19 According to Galopin, the First World War did not merit the qualification of “total war”, because the Ger-
mans tolerated unemployment (at least until 1916).