Page 140 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

642 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

after money, cargoes and ransom from the ship-owners (for themselves or the clan-based
militias). Because of the extensive Somali coastline and the lack of strong government au-
thority, combating piracy is difficult. It is hard to determine who the pirates are, as groups
professing to fight piracy are actually engaged in it. Some organize themselves along military
lines, awarding titles like admiral, vice-admiral etc. They are known by names such as
10
“National Volunteer Coast Guard” (a group that intercepts small boats and fishing vessels in
southern Somalia), while four of the major groups are called “Somali Marines”. The most
prominent pirate group is probably the “Somali Marines” based at Ceel Huur (250 miles
north of Mogadishu). They have between 75 and 100 members and their arms include AK-
47’s, 12.7mm and 14.5mm heavy machine guns and rocket launchers. 11
The modus operandi of the pirates are usually as follows: To hijack ships close to the
shore, pirates would lure them into an ambush with a false distress call or will attack ships
directly with small and fast vessels, while assaults further away from the coast will take
place from open boats, often supported by a “mother ship”. After boarding a ship, the crew
will quickly be rounded and they may even be taken ashore until a ransom is obtained, while
smaller ships will be anchored along the coast, under the protection of a local militia. Besides
hijackings more “traditional” pirate attacks and cargo theft have also taken place. Many
attacks took place as ships sailed through the congested Bab el Mandeb Strait, or waited
to anchor along the Djibouti coast. Specifically tankers carrying diesel and natural gas are
important targets, while other ships (transporting vehicles, humanitarian food aid as well as
cruise ships) have also been attacked. 12
Maritime watchdogs meticulously record reported piracy incidents. Hijacking ships for
ransom is the most common form of piracy in the region and the figure has risen dramati-
cally over the last five years to a high of 31 in 2007 (18% of the international total), while
attacks in the first quarter of 2008 were already 20% higher than the previous year. the
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recent increase in piracy is ascribed to the fact that coastal and port surveillance are virtually
completely absent and the poverty and desperation of the Somali people.
The International Maritime Bureau has warned that if the international naval vessels op-
erating around the Horn of Africa do not do more, for example to also intercept and appre-
hend suspicious craft, unrestrained piracy will continue. though large, sophisticated and
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expensive warships are not required for suppressing piracy as smaller ship can do the work,
the reality is that it is mostly the sophisticated naval vessels belonging to the international
Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) that patrols the waters of the region. If a pirate inci-
dent occurs, any warship in its vicinity must act and naval vessels have managed to destroy

10 ‘Waters That Prompt Fear From the Toughest of Sailors’, New York Times, 3 July 2006, in http://www.nyti-
mes.com/2006/07/03/world/africa/03somalia.html.
11 ‘Piracy Plagues Somali Waters’, OXFAM, 19 November 2007, in http://www.forbes.com/home/
business/2007/11/16/somalia-piracy-africa-biz-cx_1119oxford.html.
12 Ibid.
13 ‘Reported piracy incidents rise sharply in 2007’, Weekly Piracy Report, International Chamber of Com-
merce, Commercial Crime Services, http://icc-ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=102, See also ‘Captain: My
“Heart Sank” When Pirates Attacked’, CNN, 5 May 2008, in CHINFO News Clips, 6 May 2008.
14 ‘Piracy Plagues Somali Waters’, OXFAM, 19 November 2007, in http://www.forbes.com/home/
business/2007/11/16/somalia-piracy-africa-biz-cx_1119oxford.html.