Page 142 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II
P. 142

644                                XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

           that “these troops can also come ashore if necessary”.  At the beginning of June 2008, the
                                                         21
           Security Council unanimously approved a resolution allowing, with the consent of the Soma-
           lia’s interim government, foreign warships to “enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the
           purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.”  States evidently wished for
                                                                22
           a clearer framework of international action. The Security Council action is significant, as it is
           using the force of international law to allow navies to chase pirates and armed robbers.

           Lawlessness at Sea: Asymmetrical Threat
              Within the context of the early 21  century, an asymmetrical threat and the risk of terror
                                          st
           incidents at sea cannot be ruled out. This was initially clearly illustrated by two incidents,
           namely the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro by members of the Palestine
           Liberation Front off Egypt in the Mediterranean (October 1985) and the attack on the USS
           Cole in Aden (12 October 2000). These incidents indicated that maritime terror can be real
           and states need to consider potential responses. Port security was emphasised after the USS
           Cole attack, but after “9/11”, the focus quickly turned to air transport.
              Soon afterwards, on 6 October 2002, the potential danger an asymmetric attack posed
           was dramatically illustrated when the 300 000 ton double-hulled French supertanker Lim-
           burg was rammed amidships by an explosive-laden dinghy a few miles offshore in the Gulf
           of Aden (off Yemen). She caught fire and much of the cargo (about 90 000 barrels of oil)
           spilled into the sea. Though Yemeni officials initially maintained the incident was an acci-
           dent, Al Qaeda subsequently claimed responsibility for it. The attack immediately caused an
           increase in the oil price (it broke through the $30-00 level) and Yemen lost millions in port
           revenues as international shipping decreased. 23
              Of significance though is the fact that not even warships are exempted from possible harm
           and, vessels, perhaps even merchant vessels, can be used as weapons of war. Furthermore,
           it is obvious that a very effective way to disrupt the global economy is by attacking oil sup-
           plies, or supply routes. In this respect, shipping around Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden is
           specifically vulnerable and important.

           Effect on the Marine Environment: Fishing
              In the developing world environmental security, including the marine environment is
           essential for sustainable development. As populations are making ever-increasing demands
           on it in their efforts to provide for themselves, the links between the environment, scarce
           resources and conflict is apparent.
              Internationally the maritime environment is severely threatened by the massive increase
           in commercial and illegal fishing, but in the developing world, where maritime policing is
           lacking, it threatens fishing grounds and subsistence fishing communities. the commercial


           21   ‘Somali President Asks French for Troops, Naval Help’, Reuters, 5 May 2008; ‘Brute Force on the High
               Seas’, Der Tagesspiegel, 25 April 2008.
           22   ‘U.N. OK’s Foreign Ships to Fight Somali Pirates’, Associated Press, 2 June 2008, in Chinfo News Clips, 3
               June 2008.
           23  G. Luft and A. Korin, ‘Terrorism Goes to Sea’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004; and ‘Tanker
               attack fits bin Laden’s economic war’, Independent (London), 8 October 2002.
   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   144   145   146   147