Page 144 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II

646 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm

exercised to be recognized and even in the case of weak states the mere existence of a minor
capability is important as it could have vast political consequences even for powerful states
if they would disregard such sovereignty.
Somali has no ability to protect and defend its maritime sovereignty and the inadequate
ability to enforce central government authority ashore, is therefore also prevalent at sea.
Other countries in the Horn of Africa region struggle to build up and maintain basic naval or
coast guard forces and uphold harbour security.
Humanitarian effect: Food Aid

Conflicts in Africa usually cause much disruption to society. The humanitarian dimension
of the ongoing conflict in Somalia is substantial and widespread. Pirate attacks have hindered
humanitarian aid deliveries to the drought-plagued Horn of Africa region and it is particu-
larly damaging to millions of Somalis who depend on international relief in times of crisis.
Pirates have seized a number of WFP food shipments, including rice intended for the Somali
victims of the Asian tsunami. By April 2006 the situation was urgent as almost two million
Somalis were on the brink of famine, which was also fuelled by the worst droughts ever to
hit East Africa. Recent statistics suggests that 70% of the population is undernourished
29
and according to a WFP estimate, 300 000 to 400 000 people have fled Mogadishu between
February and May 2007.
The food distribution programme has suffered greatly. Food distribution in Mogadishu
was a problem due to local power struggles, and even senior government officials were in-
volved in underhandedness. Because of piracy, the WFP was forced to re-route much of its
30
relief supplies overland, through Kenya to southern Somalia, at far greater cost. By May
31
2007 the WFP was emphatic that high-level international action is necessary to suppress pi-
racy around Somalia as relief supplies to Somalia were under severe threat, and after a joint
32
appeal by the WFP and the International Maritime Organization, France decided to escort
food aid ships for a few months. On 16 November 2007 two ships of the WFP sailed from
Mombassa to Mogadishu in the company of French corvette Commandant Ducuing. in april
2008 the Dutch frigate, KNS Evertson, commenced escorting vessels of the WFP. These ef-
33
forts effectively provided security for food aid delivery, but as even higher demands for food
aid delivery will soon be placed on the WFP, it must be maintained in conjunction with other
efforts to provide security in the maritime domain.

29 ‘Piracy Plagues Somali Waters’, OXFAM, 19 November 2007, in http://www.forbes.com/home/
business/2007/11/16/somalia-piracy-africa-biz-cx_1119oxford.html.
30 ‘Somalia Food Aid Stopped’, in Islamic Focus, CiPS, University of Pretoria, Issue 13 November 2007
31 ‘Somali Piracy A Menace To Aid Relief’, TerraDaily, 20 April 2006, in http://www.terradaily.com/
reports/Somali_Piracy_A_Menace_To_Aid_Relief.html
32 ‘WFP urges high-level international action against Somali piracy’, World Food Programme, 21 May 2007,
in http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=2486.
33 Official French and Dutch sources; Radio Netherlands, 1 April 2008, in CHINFO News Clips, 3 April 2008;
and ‘Concerned at conditions in Somalia, Security Council urges end to violence’, UN News Centre, 19
November 2007, in http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=24715&Cr=somalia&Cr1.