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gling, poses a threat to proper state authority and undermines the rule of law and security.
The unique challenge is therefore to create order ashore and at sea and a considerable portion
of the response is at sea. Often the mere presence of a navy, coastguard or civilian policing
agency does much to enhance maritime security.
Naval forces and coast guards can contribute much as they can assist with maintaining
good order at sea. Naval forces have a unique advantage over armies and air forces in the
sense that they do not necessarily appear menacing, but because of their ability to use force,
they can quickly switch from being an innocent bystander to being a belligerent. Navies can
easily perform diplomatic tasks or be coercive diplomats; they could project power ashore;
protect trade, sea lanes and military supplies; deny an opponent the use of the sea; protect
offshore resources or along the coast; acquire bases from which to operate; move and sup-
port troops; and gain and maintain air and sea control in support of operations both at sea and
on land. In line with the above they could also provide humanitarian and disaster relief,
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guard against illicit trade, piracy, terrorism, pollution and the overexploitation of maritime
resources. These tasks require the physical presence of naval or coastguard vessels, good in-
telligence and multinational cooperation. As the escorting of the ships of the WFP has shown,
naval vessels do contribute substantially. However, it is in these spheres that capabilities in
the region are lacking and current international assistance must be kept up.
Fishery control is a typical constabulary or so-called “blue light” function, requiring in-
spections, a constant presence at sea, but usually not physical force. Somali and Yemeni
Ministers of Fisheries agreed in July 2007 to combat pouching and piracy and to protect
traditional fishermen. It is an important step ahead, yet the challenge is to enforce it.
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Though such tasks are tedious, routine tasks, it could become coercive maritime diplomacy
if it involves combating international piracy and terrorism, the detection and prevention of
smuggling and countering environmental threats at sea. 45
As civilian systems of maritime policing and coastguards are insufficient in the region,
international naval assistance and cooperation has contributed much towards providing more
security within the maritime domain. Currently CTF 150 is the most conspicuous interna-
tional, or coalition, naval involvement in the region. CtF 150 must monitor, inspect, board
and stop suspect shipping, limit maritime crime and piracy and conduct “operations to assist
states in the region to combat terrorism and to enhance regional stability”. its operational
46
area includes the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea
and the indian ocean. CTF 150 is a deterrent and has been very active in enhancing mari-
47

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43 J.B. Hattendorf, ‘The Conceptual Foundations for Maritime Strategy in the 21 Century’ in Africa Defence
Review, No 18, 1994 in http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/ADR18/Hattendorf.html. See also G. Till (ed), Sea-
power at the Millennium, p.5.
44 ‘Yemen, Somalia agree on Protecting Fishermen’, Yemen News Agency, 5 July 2007, in http://www.illegal-
fishing.org/item_single.php?item=news&item_id=1745&approach_id=17.
45 M.H. Murfett, ‘Gunboat Diplomacy: Outmoded or Back in Vogue?’ in A. Dorman and M.L. Smith (eds), The
Changing Face of Maritime Power (MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1999), p.87.
46 ‘Piracy and Maritime Crime (Horn of Africa)’, UKMTO Dubai Briefing, UK Maritime Trade Operations, 21
September 2006 and ‘Coalition Naval Force Secures Energy Assets ‘, Gulf Times, 13 December 2007.
47 Naval vessels from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, Aus-
tralia, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia participate, or