Page 148 - Conflitti Militari e Popolazioni Civili - Tomo II
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650 XXXIV Congresso della CommIssIone InternazIonale dI storIa mIlItare • CIHm
time security, combating lawlessness at sea, and fighting pirates. No single state has the
48
capacity to conduct such extensive operations on its own, which makes the requirement for
a permanent coalition force obvious. However, as most European countries are unlikely to
get involved in Africa unilaterally, their involvement stems from their NATO and eU respon-
sibilities. 49
From the African perspective, the possible role of the new US Africa Command (AF-
RICOM) is quite controversial. Its aim is to protect America’s strategic interest and assist
African countries with training and conflict prevention, while coastal countries could be
supported with developing at least a credible coastguard. A number of African countries
50
have expressed reservations about AFRICOM, fearing an expansion of American influence
in Africa with oil interests, or the African dimension of the American “war on terror”, as its
primary focus. African opposition have led to AFRICOM headquarters remaining in Stutt-
gart, Germany. 51
Maintaining maritime security around the coast of Africa is essentially an African respon-
sibility. However, many African states have difficultly to maintain maritime sovereignty and
to be expected to also participate in a multi-national naval task force would pose a major
challenge. as navies in the region have limited budgets, states should cooperate. Collective
security and regional co-operation offers important advantages and nations must recognize
that it may allow more to be done with less. It is therefore important to identify the tools Af-
rican navies require and prominent states, and navies, should assist smaller ones with mate-
rial and developing skills. The focus should be on good capabilities, with states contributing
and specialising on various levels, which would be much cheaper than all navies trying to do
everything. Also, within the policy environment, the Common African Defence and Secu-
rity Policy of the African Union (where the concept of the Africa Standby Force originated)
should address maritime security as human security and development targets will be hard to
achieve without maritime security. 52
In the economic and humanitarian sphere alone, the lack of maritime security has had
a considerable effect on Somalia and the region. Yet, maritime security usually does not
receive enough focus in the African security debate and a higher awareness with a greater
will to act is specifically necessary in the Horn of Africa region. States should improve law
enforcement, customs, environmental control and port security, and establish authority in
their coastal waters. A number of countries in the region have, and are currently addressing
maritime security problems. Yemeni authorities have improved port security in Aden and its
Coastguard police coastal waters; however, they lack equipment and should receive more as-
have participated, in it.
48 ‘French Navy Hands Command of CTF 150 to Pakistan’, US Fifth Fleet Combined Maritime Forces, 1
August 2007, in http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2007/162.html.
49 Official French and German sources. See also ‘Combined Task Force 150’, US Fifth Fleet Combined Mari-
time Forces, in http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2007/162.html.
50 ‘Africa Command Gives Top Priority To Aggressive Maritime Security’, American Forces Information Ser-
vice, 24 october 2007, CHiNFo News Clips, 24 october 2007.
51 ‘Nigeria Won’t House AFRICOM’, Associated Press, 19 November 2007, CHiNFo News Clips, 20 Novem-
ber 2007.
52 ‘Experts Warn of Piracy Threat to South African Waters’, Pretoria News, 27 November 2006.

